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WHY TAIWAN IS NOT HONG KONG: A REVIEW OF THE
PRC'S "ONE COUNTRY TWO SYSTEMS" MODEL FOR
REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN
Sean Cooney t
Abstract: This article critically examines the "One Country Two Systems" model
(OCTS) developed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) for achieving the
reunification of Taiwan. The model is in many respects the same as that already applied
in Hong Kong. The PRC promises that under OCTS, the Taiwanese will enjoy a "high
degree of autonomy", be "masters in their own house" and maintian their way of life.
However, in contrast to the people of Hong Kong, who have never enjoyed full
democracy, the Taiwanese have achieved a much greater degree of autonomy and
accountability than is possible under OCTS. The OCTS model cannot therefore deliver
what it promises. The Article demonstrates this by comparing OCTS as elaborated in the
Basic Law of Hong Kong with the current constitutional and political arrangements in
Taiwan.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the transfer of full sovereignty over Hong Kong' and Macau2 to
the People's Republic of China ("PRC") assured, Beijing faces one
remaining obstacle to its goal of national reunification, what it calls the
"Taiwan question."3 Beijing's policy for achieving peaceful reunification
of mainland China and Taiwan is essentially the same as that applied in
Hong Kong and Macau, and is known as "one country two systems"
("OCTS")4 Under OCTS, Taiwan would, like Hong Kong and Macau,
become a "special administrative region" under the authority of the PRC
central government. However, it would be permitted to enjoy a "high
t Sean Cooney B.A. (Hons), LL.M. (Melb.) (1993) is a Lecturer in Law and an Associate Director
of the Asian Law Centre at the University of Melbourne, Australia. I would like to thank Sarah Biddulph,Huang Jau-yuan, Ian Malkin, Richard Mitchell, Malcolm Smith, Wang Tay-sheng and, in particular, my
researcher Julian Sempill for comments on and assistance with this article. I wish also to acknowledge the
support of the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation. The views, and errors, are of course my own.NOTE: The Pinyin romanisation system is used primarily in this article. This system is standard inthe PRC, but not in Taiwan. Where Taiwanese names or places have, to the author's knowledge, alreadybeen transliterated into English using a system other than pinyin (e.g. Wade-Giles), those transliterationshave been retained. However, both the pinyin and the Wade-Giles transliteration systems are used for thefirst full citation of materials. Translations are by the author unless otherwise indicated.
' See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIreland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19,1984, U.K.-P.R.C., arts. 1-2, reprinted in People's Republic of China-United Kingdom: Agreement on theFuture of Hong Kong, 23 I.L.M. 1366 (1984), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ILMTY File[hereinafter Joint Declaration on Hong Kong] (providing for the transfer of sovereignty from the UnitedKingdom to the People's Republic of China on July 1, 1997). For a discussion of the Joint Declaration, seeMichael Landry, Recent Developments, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 249 (1985).
2 Joint Declaration of the Government of the Portugal and the Government of the People's Republic
of China on the Question of Macau, available in BEIJING REv., Apr. 6, 1987. The Declaration provides
that China will resume full sovereignty over Macau on Dec. 20, 1999. Id.
I TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE AND INFORMATION OFFICE, STATE COUNCIL, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OFCHINA, TAIWAN WENTI YU ZHONGGUO DE TONGYI [T'AIWAN WENT'I YU CHUNGKUO TE T'uNGI][THE
TAIWAN QUESTION AND THE REUNIFICATION OF CHINA] (1993), English translation reprinted in JOHN F.COOPER, WORDS ACROSS THE TAIwAN STRAIT: A CRITIQUE OF BEIJING'S "WHITE PAPER" ON CHINA'S
REUNIFICATION, 73-92 (1995) [hereinafter TAIWAN QUESTION].
' See infra discussion Part II.
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degree of autonomy" in executive, legislative, and judicial matters, and its
capitalist way of life would be preserved for an indefinite period.
The PRC government has not elaborated on the OCTS model insofar
as it is intended to operate in Taiwan. However, it has done so in relation to
Hong Kong, by enacting the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region ("Basic Law"). While the PRC government has
indicated some important differences between the application of OCTS to
Taiwan and Hong Kong, it has repeatedly stated that the fundamental
concepts will be the same in both cases.6 An examination of the PRC's
implementation of OCTS in Hong Kong therefore provides an important
indication of its intentions for Taiwan. This article analyses key provisions
of the Hong Kong Basic Law to assess the impact of OCTS on Taiwan.
The government in Taiwan, which describes itself as the government
of the Republic of China ("ROC"),7 rejects OCTS. 8 OCTS is based on the
premise that Taiwan is part of the PRC, but the ROC government claims
that it is a sovereign state. While there is a strong argument that Taiwan
should be regarded as a state in international law,9 most countries do not
regard Taiwan, or the ROC, as a state, 0 and it is not a member of the United
Nations." This is arguably, in some cases at least, because the PRC
See infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text. The period of 50 years is stipulated, in relation to
Hong Kong, in the Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, supra, note 1, art. 3(12). No time limit has been fixed
in relation to Taiwan as of yet.
6 See infra discussion Part 11.
7 Or, more informally, the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan. In this article,
"Taiwan" will be used to refer to the area under the effective jurisdiction of the government in Taipei (the
ROC government), i.e. Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands (or Penghu), and the islands of Matsu and Kinmen.
As used in this article, "Taiwanese people" refers to all citizens of the ROC. Although the term is
sometimes used to refer only to the dominant ethnic group--the Minnan Chinese who commenced
emigrating to Taiwan many centuries ago, in this article the author also includes the "mainlanders" who
fled with the Kuomintang ("KMT") in 1949, the Hakka minority, and the indigenous people of the island
(yuanzhumin).
See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
9 See infra note 51.
" It is not officially recognised as a state by most nations, although it is treated as a defacto state by
many of those nations. Cheri Attix, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Are Taiwan's Trading
Partners Implying Recognition of Taiwanese Statehood?, 25 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 357, 379-387 (1995);
Andrew Godwin, Legal Aspects of Australia's Commercial Relationship with Taiwan, 4 BOND L.R. 41
(1992). See also Taiwan Relations Act (1979), 22 U.S.C. § 3301 (1979).
" The ROC left the United Nations in 1971; its seats in the General Assembly and on the Security
Council were taken by the PRC. Recent attempts by the ROC to gain readmission to the United Nations
have been strongly opposed by the PRC and have failed. Bernard T.K. Joei, The Republic of China's
United Nations Membership: A Challenge, 1992-1994 CHINA Y.B. 21 (1994); Hungdah Chiu, The
International Law of Recognition and the Status of the Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE L. 193, 197-198
(1989).
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opposes any nation recognising the ROC. 2 The ROC's rejection of the
OCTS based on statehood arguments thus encounters problems arising from
international realpolitik.
This article presents objections to the OCTS model that do not rest on
particular views of Taiwan's statehood. The argument here is that the
imposition of OCTS on Taiwan would radically reduce the degree of
autonomy and accountability which currently exists in the Taiwanese
political system. While it might once have been compatible, to some extent,
with the nature of government in Taiwan, it is no longer so.
Part II of the article examines the history of the OCTS model.
Although it is being implemented first in Hong Kong, it was originally
conceived as a method of achieving reunification with Taiwan and its
application to Hong Kong is viewed by the PRC as a "test-run" for Taiwan.
Part III compares the constitutional system in Hong Kong under British rule
with the constitutional system currently in place in Taiwan, which OCTS is
intended to displace. While there were many similarities between Hong
Kong and Taiwan in the early 1980's when OCTS was first being
developed, by 1996 the political systems of the two entities had radically
diverged. The experience gained from instituting OCTS in Hong Kong has
become increasingly irrelevant to Taiwan. Part IV considers Hong Kong's
Basic Law to determine the impact such a law would have on Taiwan. The
discussion focuses on the Basic Law provisions concerning the relationship
between the governmental organs in Hong Kong and the PRC central
government, and on the autonomy and accountability of those organs.
In this discussion, autonomy refers to the extent to which the people
in Taiwan or Hong Kong are free to regulate their own governmental affairs
without external constraint or interference. 3 This includes their capacity to
determine their own constitutional framework, enact and interpret laws, and
implement policies. Accountability refers to extent to which officials in the
governmental organs in Hong Kong and Taiwan are chosen by and
responsible to the people in those regions.' 4  Both autonomy and
12 See infra note 51.
" Hannum and Lillich maintain that "autonomy" is "not a term of art or a concept which has a
generally accepted definition in international law." Hurst Hannum & Richard Lillich, The Concept of
Autonomy in International Law, in MODELS OF AUTONOMY, 215 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1981). Compare
Louis Sohn, Models of Autonomy within the United Nations Framework, in id.; see also HURST HANNUM,
AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS,
458-68 (1990).
14 The term "accountability" is used in a wide range of contexts. The focus here is on the
accountability of governmental organs to the people of a political community, either through the electoral
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accountability are intended to be understood in a comparative rather than a
.prescriptive sense. This article does not deal with the extent to which
Taiwan (or Hong Kong 5 ) should enjoy autonomy and accountability or
what these concepts should mean for them by reference to international
standards;' 6 the argument is simply that the implementation of OCTS (as it
is presently conceived by the PRC) in Taiwan would, in contrast to the
position in Hong Kong, severely diminish both autonomy and
accountability.
II. THE "ONE COUNTRY Two SYSTEMS" MODEL
Although the PRC government is implementing the OCTS model in
Hong Kong and Macau, it originally developed the model in order to
achieve reunification with Taiwan. 17 Following the death of Mao Zedong
and the advent of the "Dengist" era in the late 1970's, the Chinese
Communist Party ("CCP") made a significant shift in its policy towards the
island. In 1978, at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Central
Committee, PRC officials departed from earlier rhetoric calling for the
"liberation" of Taiwan by force'" and began to emphasise "peaceful
reunification.' 9 In 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People's
process or through the control exercised by one elected government organ over another. This article does
not discuss other forms of accountability, such as that promoted through mechanisms of administrative
review. See generally DENNIS GALLIGAN, DISCRETIONARY POWERS, 4 (1986).
" Although this article argues that OCTS would have a much greater impact on the constitutional
system in Taiwan than it has had in Hong Kong, it does not assume that OCTS grants an appropriate degree
of autonomy and accountability to the people of Hong Kong. It claims only that OCTS is more compatible
with the nature of government in Hong Kong under British rule than it is with government in present-day
Taiwan.
6 For assessments of whether Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of autonomy under the Basic Law in
comparison with other autonomous entities, see Brian Tamanaha, Post-1997 Hong Kong: A Comparative
Study of the Meaning of "High Degree of Autonomy," 20 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 41 (1989); ENBAO WANG,
HONG KONG 1997: THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION 63 (1995) [hereinafter WANG, HONG KONG, 1997].
"7 See HSIN-HSING Wu, BRIDGING THE STRAIT: TAIWAN, CHINA AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
REUNIFICATION, 23(1994), LAI-TO LEE, THE REUNIFICATION OF CHINA: PRC-TAIWAN RELATIONS IN FLUX,
4-31 (1991); SIMON LONG, TAjwAN: CHINA'S LAST FRONTIER, 163 (1991); WANG, HONG KONG, 1997,
supra note 16, at 42-44; Byron S.J. Weng, The Evolution of a Divided China, in THE CHINESE AND THEIR
FUTURE: BEIJING, TAIPEI AND HONG KONG 345 (Zhiling Lin & Thomas W. Robinson eds., 1994) (Weng
provides a useful chronology of major events affecting relations between Taiwan, Hong Kong and
mainland China between 1978 and 1992, at 371-77).
's WU, supra, note 17, at 19.
'9 Id. at 20. Li Jiaquan, "One Country Two Systems Concept": Its Formation and Development,
BEJING REV., Jan. 4-10, 1988, at 21-22; Lang Kao, A New Relationship Across the Taiwan Strait, 27
ISSUES & STUDIES 44, 53-57 (1991). Kao comments that the CCP has adopted four strategies to persuade
the Taiwanese to reunify: a nationalistic appeal based on traditional Chinese ideas that China can only be
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Congress ("NPC") issued a Message to Compatriots in Taiwan urging
national reunification and stating that the PRC would "respect the status quo
on Taiwan and the views of people of all walks of life there and adopt
reasonable policies and measures., 20 This was followed in 1981 by a Nine-
Point Proposal, issued by Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing
Committee; 2' the core concepts of the OCTS model appeared at points three
and four of the Proposal:
3. After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high
degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and it
can retain its armed forces. The Central Government will not
interfere with local affairs on Taiwan.
4. Taiwan's current socio-economic system will remain
unchanged, so will its way of life and its economic and cultural
relations with foreign countries. 22  (emphasis added)
In 1982, Deng Xiaoping, then China's paramount leader, endorsed
the Nine-Point Proposal and described it as "embod[ying] the 'one country
two systems' principle. 23 In the following year, he explained that, as a
strong and prosperous if it is unified; claims that reunification will bring economic benefits to the
Taiwanese; threats to use force (inter alia if Taiwan declares independence or refuses to negotiate on
reunification); and the blocking of Taiwan's attempts at diplomatic recognition and participation in
international institutions. CCP threats to use force to resolve the "Taiwan issue" are backed up by war
games conducted in the Straits of Taiwan during Taiwanese elections, including the 1996 presidential
elections. James Pringle, Peking Ends Military Manoeuvres Off Taiwan, TIMES, Mar. 26, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 6483920.
20 Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Gao Taiwan Tongbao Shu [Kao T'aiwan
T'ungpao Shu][Message to Compatriots in Taiwan], RENMIN RIBAO, Jan. 1, 1979, at 1.
21 Ye Jianying Weliuanzhang Jinyibu Chanming Taiwan Huigui Zuguo Shixing Heping Tongyi de
Fangzhen Zhengce [Yeh Chienying Weiyuanchang Chinipu Ch 'anming T'aiwan Huikuei Tsukuo Shihhsing
Hoping T'ungi te Fangchen Chengts'el[Chairman Ye Jianying's Elaborations on Policy Concerning
Return of Taiwan to the Motherland and Peaceful Unification, RENMIN RIBAO, Oct. 1, 1981, at 1,
translated in BEIJING REV., Oct. 5, 1981, at 10 [hereinafter Ye Jianying's Elaborations].
22 Id. at 10. Article 31 of the 1982 CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA [hereinafter
XIANFA [P.R.C.]] was adopted by the National People's Congress in order to permit the creation of SARs.
Wu, supra, note 17, at 22. Article 31 provides:
"The state may establish special administrative regions when necessary. The systems to be instituted
in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in
the light of specific conditions."
23 Li, supra note 19, at 22. Deng Xiaoping had stated that OCTS is one of the "Chinese
characteristics" in the oft-used phrase "building socialism with Chinese characteristics." Current Policies
and Prospects for Hong Kong, BEIJING REV., Jan. 4-10, 1988, at 18. For an explanation of OCTS in terms
of Marxist ideology, see Wen Qing, "One Country Two Systems: The Best Way to Peaceful Reunification,
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special administrative region, Taiwan would "exercise independent
jurisdiction and the right of final judgement."24 Taiwan would be permitted
to keep its military, and the mainland would station neither troops nor
administrative personnel there." It would "administer its own political
parties, government and armed forces. 26 However, Deng also stressed that
"complete autonomy" was unacceptable, that the Taiwanese administration
would have the status of a local government and that only the PRC (as
opposed to the ROC) could represent China internationally. 27
The current official PRC position on OCTS as it applies to Taiwan
appears in the State Council's 1993 White Paper on "the Taiwan Question
and the Reunification of China" ("White Paper").28 Part III of the White
Paper reiterates the PRC's basic position of "peaceful unification; one
country two systems. 29  The White Paper sets out four key principles,
which may be summarised as follows:
(1) There is only one China, of which Taiwan is a part. The
central government of China is in Beijing and the "authorities
in Taipei"3 are therefore not a legitimate government of China.
The PRC opposes the following models: the "Two Chinas"
model (the mainland as one China and Taiwan as a separate
China); the "One Country Two Governments" model (one
China but one government in Beijing and a separate
government in Taipei); and the "One China, One Taiwan"
model (the existence of an independent Taiwan-that is,
BEUING REV., Aug. 13-19, 1990, at 14. Deng Xiaoping died in February of this year. Seth Faison, Deng
Xiaoping is Dead at 92, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1997, at A6.
14 Deng Xiaoping tan Zhongguo Dalu he Taiwan Heping Tongyi Shexiang [Teng Hsiaop'ing t'an
Chungkuo Talu ho T'aiwan Hoping T'ungi Shehsiangl[Deng Xiaoping Discusses the Plan for the Peaceful
Reunification of Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland], RENMIN RIBAO, Jul. 30, 1983, at 1.
23 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
23 TAIWAN QUESTION, supra note 3; Cooper, supra note 3, (a highly critical analysis of the White
Paper).
2' TAIWAN QUESTION, supra note 3, at 86. These two policies were reaffirmed by President Jiang
Zemin in his 1997 new year's greeting. Chinese President's New Year Greeting, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Jan. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, XINHUA File. The policies were subsequently
reaffirmed by the Chairman of the NPC in an interview with a U.S. journalist. NPC Chairman Accepts
Interview by US. Journalist, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
XINHUA File.
30 "Authorities" [dangju][tangchu] is the term commonly used by the PRC government to refer to
the government in Taipei.
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Taiwan as a separate country). The White Paper states that
"'Self-determination' for Taiwan is out of the question." 31
(2) Although there is only one China, it is possible for socialist
and capitalist societies to co-exist within it, so that, after
reunification, Taiwan's "current socio-economic system, its
way of life as well as economic and cultural ties with foreign
countries can remain unchanged. 3 2
(3) After reunification, Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of
autonomy as a special administrative region ("SAR"). It will
have its own administrative and legislative powers, an
independent judiciary and right of adjudication and "will run
its own party, political, military, economic and financial
affairs." It will, to some extent, be able to conclude agreements
with foreign countries (but not, of course, as a sovereign
nation). Government representatives in the Taiwan SAR will
be eligible for appointment to senior posts in the central
government.33
(4) Economic and other links between mainland China should
be rapidly expanded and negotiations towards reunification
commenced as soon as possible.34
Part III of the White Paper also states that the "Taiwan issue" is a domestic
affair, involving no foreign government-that it is not analogous to the
Korean and German "divided country" situations, and that the PRC reserves
the right to use military force to uphold its sovereignty and territorial
integrity over Taiwan. 35
The principles in the White Paper have been reaffirmed by Jiang
Zemin, the PRC's current President, who has also emphasised that, within
31 TAIWAN QUESTION, supra note 3, at 88.
32 Id.
33 Id
" Id at 88-92.
31 Id. at 86.
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the OCTS framework, the Taiwanese will be "masters of their own home"
[dangjia zuo zhu].36
The White Paper, however, does not provide clear details of how
OCTS will work in practice in Taiwan. The PRC has elaborated on the
OCTS model with Hong Kong, not Taiwan, as the reference point. This
change occurred because negotiations between the PRC and the United
Kingdom on the future of Hong Kong led the PRC to adopt OCTS as the
basis for regulating the relations between Hong Kong and the PRC central
government following its resumption of sovereignty. 37 The concrete form
of OCTS as it applies to Hong Kong is now reflected in the Basic Law of
the Hong Kong SAR, adopted by the National People's Congress on April
4, 1990.31
There are important differences between the OCTS model outlined in
the White Paper on Taiwan and the principles behind the Hong Kong Basic
Law. According to the White Paper, the Taiwanese are to be granted
greater autonomy than the people of Hong Kong, in that they would retain
their military, party and political systems after reunification.
39
Nevertheless, the central features of the White Paper's OCTS model for
Taiwan are the same as those of the Basic Law: the creation of an "SAR"
subordinate to the central government; the preservation of the current socio-
economic system and way of life; the enjoyment of a "high degree of
autonomy" in the exercise of legislative, executive and judicial powers
36 Jiang Zemin zai Xinchun Chahuahuishang Fabiao Zhongda Jianghua, [Chiang Tsemin tsai
Hsinch 'un Ch 'ahuahuishang Fapiao Chungta Chianghua][Jiang Zemin makes an important speech at a
Chinese New Year Tea Reception][hereinafter Jiang ZeminJianghua] RENMIN RIBAO, Jan. 31, 1995, at 1;
see also Premier Reaffirms Policy Toward Taiwan, BEIJING REV., Feb. 19-25, 1996, at 15. Jiang Zemin
has produced an Eight-Point Proposal. While reasserting that "[tihe lifestyle of our Taiwanese compatriots
and their will to be the masters of their home must be freely respected," the Proposal emphasises PRC
sovereignty over Taiwan: "China's sovereignty and territory are never to be divided. Any attempts, in
words or deeds to create an 'independent Taiwan' or to 'split the country and rule under separate regimes'
or to create 'two Chinas over a certain period of time' must be resolutely opposed." Id.
" WU, supra note 17, at 23; LEE, supra note 17, at 11; LONG, supra note 17, at 162-65; WANG,
supra note 16, at 44-50.
"' The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China, adopted on Apr. 4 1990 by the Seventh National People's Congress of the People's Republic of
China at its Third Session, reprinted in THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR 'STABILITY AND
PROSPERITY' UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY, 165-209 (Ming K. Chan and David J. Clark eds., 1991)
[hereinafter BAsIc LAW]. Compare the very similar Basic Law of the Macau Special Administrative
Region of the People's Republic of China, adopted on Mar. 31, 1993 by the Eight National People's
Congress of the People's Republic of China at its First Session, available at http://www.sftw.
umac.mo/tour/basic-law/english/main.html.
31 TAIWAN QUESTION, supra note 3, at 84; see generally WU, supra note 17, at 31; LEE, supra note
17, at 13; LONG, supra note 17, at 163.
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(including an independent judiciary); and a significant degree of control
over local governmental and economic affairs.
The PRC clearly links the resolution of Hong Kong and Taiwan
issues together. Its officials have emphasised that the basic principles of the
model are applicable to both, and have stated that the creation of the Hong
Kong SAR will enable it to prove to Taiwan that OCTS is feasible and can
operate successfully in Taiwan.4 ° Several other commentators also view the
Hong Kong experience of OCTS as having great significance for Taiwan.4'
In sum, although a "Basic Law of Taiwan" (should one be passed by
the PRC's National People's Congress) 42  would be likely to differ
40 In a speech to members of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region's Basic Law Drafting
Committee, Deng Xiaoping stated that "[t]his Basic Law [of Hong Kong] should set an example for Macau
and Taiwan, so it is very important." Current Policies and Prospects for Hong Kong, BEIJING REV., Jan. 4-
10, 1988, at 14; see also Zai Zhongyang Guwen Weiyvuanhui Disanci Quanti Huiyishang de Jianghua
I7s 'ai Chungyang Kuwen Weiyianhui Tisantz 'u Chuiant'i Huiishang de Chianghua][Speech of Deng
Xiaoping at the Third Conference of the Central Advisory Committee of the Chinese Communist Party],
RENMIN RIBAO, Jan. 1, 1985, 1. Deng Xiaoping said: "The resolution of the Hong Kong question will
directly influence the Taiwan question. Using the method of one country two systems should be something
they can accept." See generally C. L. Chiou, Dilemmas in China's Reunification Policy Toward Taiwan,
26 ASIAN SURVEY 467, 470-474 (1986); WU, supra note 17, at 23; LEE, supra note 17, at 11; WANG, supra
note 16; LONG, supra note 17, at 162. Long writes that "Hong Kong was both a dry run for the
reintegration of Taiwan, and China's best chance of demonstrating to the sceptical Taiwan public that it
was feasible." On Jan. 3, 1997, the official China News Agency's domestic service stated that the success
of OCTS in Hong Kong "will increase people's confidence and accumulate experiences that China can
follow upon re-establishing sovereignty over Macau in 1999 and settling the Taiwan issue." Xinhua Looks
Forward to Hong Kong's Future in 1997, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 3, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, ALLNWS File.
"' See, e.g., Agnes Bundy, The Reunification of China with Hong Kong and its Implications for
Taiwan: An Analysis of the "One Country, Two Systems" Model, 19 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 271, 282-284
(1989); Joseph Cheng, The Constitutional Relationship between the Central Government and the Future
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 65, 97 (1988).
Compare Hungdah Chiu, Legal Problems with the Hong Kong Model for Unification of China and their
Implications for Taiwan, 2 J. CHINESE L. 83 (1988). Chiu suggests that "political, economic, social and
strategic issues" mean that the PRC needs to adopt an approach to Taiwan which is different from that
taken in Hong Kong. Id at 93.
42 During the cross-straits tension in the build-up to the Taiwanese presidential elections in March
1996, the PRC's Xinhua News Agency reported that Lin Liyun, a "Taiwan deputy" to the NPC and
member of the NPC Standing Committee, proposed enacting a law called "Basic Law of the Taiwan
Special Administrative Region." Basic Law on Taiwan Proposed, XNHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 14, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, XINXUA File. Another deputy, Wang Ansheng also proposed that
the NPC enact a law governing mainland-Taiwan relations which would contain the key OCTS concepts.
He said that the law would state that Taiwan is part of China and that its autonomy would be protected.
NPC Deputies Propose Legislation on Taiwan Issue, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 8, 1996, available in
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, XINHUA File. In October 1996, the South China Morning Post reported that Li
Jiaquan, a researcher at the Taiwan Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences believed to be a
consultant to President Jiang Zemin, had indicated that a Basic Law for Taiwan was being planned. Munn
Tam, Beiing planning a Basic Law for Taiwan, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 19, 1996, at 10, available
in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, ALLNWS File.
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significantly from the Hong Kong Basic Law in many respects, the two
Laws must, on a fundamental level, share common features if the OCTS
model is to be adhered to. An analysis of the Hong Kong Basic Law
therefore sheds light on how the government in Beijing intends to regulate
Taiwan, should it ever get the chance. This analysis will be undertaken in
Part IV.
A. The Taiwanese Government's Response to the OCTS Model
The government of the ROC has consistently rejected the OCTS
model.43 The logic behind its present approach is outlined in its response to
the White Paper, published by the ROC Mainland Affairs Council in 1994.44
The Council claims that the basic premise of the model (that the PRC is the
only legitimate government of China) is false. The Council claims that
China is in fact "at present temporarily divided into two areas under two
essentially equal political entities [benzhishang wanquan duideng de
zhengzhi shiti], the government of the ROC and the Peking regime," each
having exclusive rights in the territory under its control.45
The Council goes on to argue that the OCTS model would bring
about the loss of the way of life and basic human rights the Taiwanese
presently enjoy 46 and eventually force Taiwan to abandon its liberal
democratic system of government in favour of the CCP's form of
socialism. 47  The OCTS model is "the biggest obstacle to reunification" 48
and is "objectively unfeasible and subjectively absolutely unacceptable., 49
" Kao, supra note 19, at 57-61; WU, supra note 17, at 85-86; LEE, supra note 17, at 40-41; LONG,
supra note 17, at 232-34. For a discussion of the evolving ROC policy towards the mainland, see
Lawrence Weiner, The Impact of Taiwan's Political Reform on Its Mainland China Policy: Pragmatic
Economic Relations and Conflicting Political Ideology, PAC. RIM L.& POL'Y J. 27 (1992) (Intramural
Issue).
" MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE YUAN, TAIHAi LIANGAN GUANxi SHUOMINGSHU
[T'AIHAI LIANGAN KUANHSI SHUOMINGSHUJ [EXPLANATION OF THE RELATIONS ACROSS THE TAIWAN
STRAITS] (1994), English translation reprinted in COOPER, supra note 3, at 93-124.
41 Id. at 112.
4 Id.
47 Id.
' Dui Zhonggong "Taiwan Wenti yu Zhongguo de Tongyi" Baipishu de Kanfa [Tui Chungkung
"T'aiwan went 'i yu Chungkuo te T'ungi" Paip 'ishu te K'anfa] [ Views on Communist China's White Paper
on " The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China "], in MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, EXECUTIVE
YUAN, supra, note 44, at 80. This part of the document is not translated in Cooper; the translation
provided here is the author's own.
9 Id. As an alternative to the OCTS model, the KMT government has devised Guojia Tongyi
Gangling [Guidelines for National Reunification], passed by the National Unification Council, Feb. 23,
1991, and by the Executive Yuan at its 2223rd meeting, Mar. 14, 1991. GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL
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Since the OCTS is totally rejected by other political parties, including
the main opposition Democratic Progressive Party ("DPP") and the newly
established Taiwan Independence Party, which support complete
independence from China,5" OCTS could not be implemented in Taiwan
unless it was imposed without the consent of the Taiwanese people (the
same way it has been imposed in Hong Kong).
The remainder of this article argues that the OCTS model is not now
a feasible means of achieving reunification. This is because, quite apart
from the fact that OCTS is inconsistent with the ROC's claims to be a
"political entity" or a defacto or dejure state,5 OCTS would undermine the
REUNIFICATION, English translation reprinted in COOPER, supra note 3, at 125-27. The goal of these
Guidelines is to establish a "democratic, free and equitably prosperous China" in contrast to what the KMT
views as a socialist authoritarian state. Id. at 125. The Guidelines envisage a gradual process of
reunification, consisting of three stages: in the short term, a phase of exchanges and reciprocity; in the
medium term, a phase of trust and co-operation, including the establishment of official communication
channels, and direct postal, transport and communication links; and, in the long term, the establishment of
a consultation organisation for unification, which would develop a new constitutional system based on the
will of the people in both the mainland and Taiwan. id. at 126-27. It is clear that these Guidelines cannot
be implemented unless the form of govemment in the mainland becomes a liberal democracy, a condition
which is in fundamental conflict with the PRC Constitution and therefore unacceptable to the CCP.
' Wu, supra note 17, at 233-46. Although the DPP's presidential candidate in the 1996 elections
was a strong supporter of independence, other sections of the DPP, while continuing to advocate eventual
independence from China, have become more cautious over the issue. Partly, as a consequence of this, the
Taiwan Independence Party split from the DPP following the elections. Li Zhenyuan (Chairman of the
Taiwan Independence Party), Guanxin Zande Tudi yu Renmin [Kuanhsin Tsante T'uti yu Jenmin] [Show
Concern for Our Own Land and People], JIANGUODANO TONGXUN [CHIENKUOTANG T'UNGHSON]
[BULLETIN OF THE TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE PARTY], Dec. 10, 1996, at I.
"' These claims are not supported by most members of the international community; see supra notes
10-11 and accompanying text. However, Taiwan arguably satisfies the criteria for statehood set out in
article I of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), Dec. 26, 1933, 165
L.T.N.S. 19. It has a defined territory, a permanent population, an effective government and the capacity
to enter into relations with other states. See, e.g., Jiang Huangchi, Lun Taiwan zhi Guojia Shuxing [Lun
T'aiwan Chih Kuochia Shuhsing][A Discussion of Taiwanese Statehood], 26 GUOLI TAIWAN DAXUE FAXUE
LUNCONG [KUOLI T'AIWAN TAHSOEH FAHSOEHILUN7S'UNG][TAIWAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL]
109, 154-71(1996); Attix, supra note 10, at 366-68. Crawford maintains that "Taiwan is not a State
because it does not claim to be, and is not recognized as such: its status is that of a consolidated local de
facto government in a civil war situation." JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 151 (1979). Crawford's objections are no longer as persuasive as they once were. In
relation to the argument that Taiwan does not claim to be a state, Jiang points out that recent constitutional
reforms, including the confining of the electorate to Taiwan (see infra notes 128-131 and accompanying
text), and the Taiwanese government's assertion that both it and the PRC are political entities amount to a
"quasi declaration of independence." Jiang Huangchi, supra, at 112-48; see also Jau-Yuan Hwang,
Constitutional Change and Political Transition in Taiwan since 1986-The Role of Legal Institutions, 259-
72, 286-87 (1995) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with Harvard University
Library and author) (arguing that Taiwan has now adopted a "divided states" approach to its status, similar
to the Koreas or the pre-unification Germanies). Jiang contends that the Taiwanese government does not
openly declare itself a state because of the PRC's unlawful threat of force; hence, the failure to make such a
declaration does not constitute a denial of statehood. Jiang Huangchi, supra, at 131-35. In relation to the
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degree of governmental autonomy and accountability the Taiwanese have
come to enjoy and would therefore drastically affect their way of life. The
model therefore cannot deliver what it promises; it fails on its own terms.
The main argument is developed in Part IV. Before proceeding to that, the
constitutional history of Hong Kong under British rule and Taiwan under
Nationalist (Kuomintang or KMT) rule is reviewed. This analysis indicates
why the PRC could, in the early 1980's, have reasonably believed that
OCTS was workable in both regions. However, it also shows how events in
Taiwan over the last decade have undermined the premises upon which the
model was based.
III. AUTONOMY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN HONG KONG AND TAIWAN PRIOR
TO OCTS
When the OCTS model was first formulated in the early 1980's, the
people of Hong Kong and the people of Taiwan were both subject to legal
regimes imposed externally and had little say in determining who governed
them. Had OCTS been imposed at that time, it could have led, on paper at
least, to greater autonomy and accountability. The governmental systems of
both regions were reformed during the 1980's and early 1990's; in Hong
Kong, the change has been significant, but not fundamental. In Taiwan, on
failure of other countries to recognise Taiwan as an independent state, Crawford himself states that the
more accepted position at international law is that recognition is, generally speaking, not constitutive but
declaratory, having political not legal effect. CRAWFORD, supra, at 15- 25; Attix notes that the non-
recognition of Taiwan/ROC by most nations is a result of pressure by the PRC: "There is no indication that
these states are withholding recognition because they find Taiwan's existence repugnant or its actions in
violation of anyjus cogens principle of international law." Attix, supra note 10, at 381. Xu and Li point
out that most nations recognising the PRC simply "take note" or "acknowledge" its claim over Taiwan
rather than "accepting" or "supporting" it. XU QINGXIONG AND LI MINGJUN, XIANDAI GUOJIFA RUMEN
[HSIENTAI KUOCHIFA JUMEN][AN INTRODUCTION TO. INTERNATIONAL LAW] 322-23 (1994). See Chiu,
supra note 11. In practice, nations such as the United States and Australia, which do not officially
recognise Taiwan, treat it as a de facto state. Attix, supra note 10, at 381-85; Andrew Godwin, Legal
Aspects of Australia's Commercial Relationship with Taiwan, 4 BOND L. REv. 41 (1992). For further
discussion of Taiwan's status, see generally PENG MINGMIN AND HUANG ZHAOTANG, TAIWAN ZAI
GUOJIFASHANG DE DIWEI [T'AIWAN TSAI KUOCHIFASHANG TE TIWEI] [THE STATUS OF TAIWAN IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW] (1995) (Peng Mingmin, a former politics professor at National Taiwan University
was the unsuccessful DPP presidential candidate in the 1996 elections and is now a founding member of the
Taiwan Independence Party); Lung-chu Chen and W.M. Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for
International Title, 81 YALE L.J. 599 (1972) (arguing sovereignty over the island has been suspended since
the Peace Treaty with Japan left the issue open. They propose that an internationally supervised plebiscite
of the people of Taiwan be held to enable them to determine their future status; but cf CRAWFORD, supra,
at 147-49); and Michael Davis, The Concept of Statehood and the Status of Taiwan, 4 J. CHINESE L. 135
(1990) (examining various notions of autonomy and suggests a flexible, intermediate solution for Taiwan's
status may be preferable, neither complete independence nor complete unification).
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the other hand, the nature of government has been radically transformed.
The Taiwanese constitutional system has now little in common with that of
Hong Kong, either under British or PRC rule. OCTS is quite incompatible
with it.
A. Hong Kong Under British Rule
The people of British colonial Hong Kong enjoyed little autonomy,
nor, until the last decade, was their government accountable to them to any
significant extent. The formal constitution of Hong Kong under British rule
was a creation of the British authorities, not the people of Hong Kong.5 2 It
consisted of Letters Patent,53 supplemented by Royal Instructions,54 which
were passed by exercise of the prerogative power of the Crown55 to
establish a govemment and make law for a ceded colony.56 These
documents could be amended at any time by the Crown without reference to
the wishes of the people of Hong Kong or their elected representatives,5 7
who themselves had no power to effect amendments.5"
"2 See PETER WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG KONG, ch. 2(2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW]; Peter Wesley-
Smith, The Present Constitution of Hong Kong, in PETER WESLEY-SMITH & ALBERT CHEN, THE BASIC
LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE 5 (1988) [hereinafter Wesley-Smith, The Present Constitution]; NORMAN
MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG ch. 5 (5th ed. 1991).
5' Hong Kong Letters Patent 1917 (as amended to 1 July, 1994) [hereinafter Letters Patent],
reprinted in MINERS, supra note 52, at 248-53), available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, SI File (passed under
the Great Seal of the United Kingdom constituting the Office of Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the
Colony of Hong Kong and its Dependencies, dated Feb. 14, 1917). The 1917 Letters Patent replaced the
earlier Letters Patent entitled Charter of the Colony of Hong Kong, passed on Jun 26, 1843.
5' Hong Kong Royal Instructions 1917 (as amended to 1 July, 1994) [hereinafter Royal Instructions],
reprinted in MINERS, supra note 52, at 254-60, available in LEXIS, Enggen Library, SI File (passed under
the Royal Sign Manual and Signet to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of Hong Kong
and its Dependencies, Feb. 14, 1917). The Governor and the Legislative Council of Hong Kong are
required to conform to and observe the Royal Instructions pursuant to Article XII of the Letters Patent.
" In this context, this means that the British monarch exercises her or his prerogative in accordance
with the policies of the executive government in Britain. Wesley-Smith, The Present Constitution, supra
note 52, at 7; MINERS, supra note 52, at 55-56.
56 WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 52, at 35. Following
its defeat in the First Opium War, China ceded Hong Kong Island to the United Kingdom in perpetuity.
Treaty of Nanking, Aug 29, 1842 (ratified June 26, 1843). 30 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 389(1858), 390. Kowloon and Stonecutters Island were ceded to the British by the Convention of Peking, Oct.
24, 1860. 50 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 10 (1867). The remaining part of the colony, the New
Territories, was leased by China to the United Kingdom for 99 years by the second Convention of Peking,
June 9, 1898 (ratified Aug. 6, 1898 and entered into force July 1, 1898), reprinted in MINERS, supra note
52, at 246.
"7 Letters Patent 1917, supra note 53,- art. XX. In addition to the Letters Patent and Royal
Instructions, amendments to Hong Kong's formal constitution may be effected by the Parliament of the
United Kingdom (in accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy). WESLEY-SMITH,
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The subordination of the Hong Kong government to that of the
United Kingdom was reflected in its executive, legislature and judiciary. As
Peter Wesley-Smith comments, "the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions
... do not presuppose or create a democratic society. Indeed, their
fundamental purpose is to announce and preserve control over its colony by
the metropolitan power." '59 The head of the executive branch of government
in Hong Kong was the Governor who was not elected in Hong Kong, but
was appointed by, and derived his powers from, the Crown.6" He was
bound to implement the directives of the Crown6' and was accountable to it,
not to the people of Hong Kong.62 The Letters Patent also established an
"Executive Council '63 whose members were appointed either by the
Governor or by the Crown.' While the Executive Council operated in some
ways as a Cabinet,65 the Royal Instructions required the Governor to do no
more than consult it; he was not obliged to comply with its decisions.
66
Legislative power in Hong Kong was exercised jointly by the
Governor and the Legislative Council (known as "LegCo"); 67 neither was
able to make laws without the other's consent. The powers of LegCo were
weak. While it exercised law-making power for Hong Kong and could
control Hong Kong's expenditure, 68 it could not force the resignation of the
executive government 69 and could be dissolved by the Governor at any
time.7 ° Its legislative competence was limited7 ' in that it could not pass bills
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 52, at 34-35 and 48. See, e.g., Hong Kong Act
1985 (U.K.).
58 WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 52, at 48.
59 Id. at 46. See also Yash Ghai, The Past and Present of Hong Kong's Constitution, 128 CHINA Q.
794, 797-804 (1991).
60 Letters Patent, supra, note 53, art. I and II; see generally, WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 52, Ch. 5.
61 Letters Patent, supra note 53, art. XII.
62 WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 52, at 122-23.
63 Letters Patent, supra, note 53, art. V.
64 Letters Patent, supra, note 53, art. V; Royal Instructions, supra, note 54, cl. II-IV.
65 WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 52, at 124.
' Royal Instructions, supra, note 54, cl. X.
67 Letters Patent, supra, note 53, art. VII (1). This reads: "The Governor, by and with the advice
and consent of the Legislative Council, may make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the
colony." The Legislative Council was established by Letters Patent art. VI(l). Beginning in 1985, the
powers of LegCo were also derived from statute. Hong Kong Act 1985 sched. §3(1) (U.K.) and Hong
Kong (Legislative Powers) Order 1986, No. 1298 of 1986 (U.K.), and Hong Kong (Legislative Powers)
Order 1989, no. 153 of 1989 (U.K.).
6S MINERS, supra note 52, at 134-41.
69 In contrast to the position in the United Kingdom and other Westminster systems.
70 Royal Instructions, supra, note 54, cl. XXVIIlA(1).
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that were "repugnant to" (that is, inconsistent with) acts of the British
72 7Parliament, or the Letters Patent and Royal Instruments.73  In some
matters, its bills required the assent of the Crown (not simply the
Governor)74 and in other matters, where such consent was not needed, those
laws could nevertheless subsequently be disallowed by the Crown.75
Furthermore, LegCo was not, until shortly before the return of Hong Kong
to China, a representative institution.76 All of its members were appointed
by the Governor until 1985.77 It did not consist of a majority of elected
members until 199178 and was not fully elected until 1995.79  Even then,
only one-third of the members were directly elected,8" the rest being
selected by an Election Committee composed of local government members
or from "functional constituencies." 8'
Ultimate judicial power in Hong Kong was exercised by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, a British imperial institution. 2 Thejurisdiction and composition of this body was determined in London, where
the Committee was located, not in Hong Kong. 3
" See generally, WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 52, Ch.
7. 72 The Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, 28 & 29 Vict., ch. 63, § 2 (1865) (Eng.). See WESLEY-
SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 52, 195-99. Note that the Hong Kong
Act 1985, supra note 57, together with the Hong Kong (Legislative Powers) Order 1986, supra note 57,
and Hong Kong (Legislative Powers) Order 1989, supra note 57, gave the Hong Kong Legislature the
power to amend or repeal certain Acts of the British Parliament relating to Hong Kong.
7' Att'y Gen'l v. David Chiu Tat-cheong 2 H.K.L.R. 84 (C.A. 1992); see WESLEY-SMITH,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 52, at 199-202.
4 Royal Instructions, supra note 54, cl. XXVI listed a range of matters in which the Governor was
required to refuse consent. However, if consent was inadvertently given, the ordinance would still become
law until it was disallowed by the Crown. Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, supra note 72, s.4.
7 Letters Patent, supra, note 53, art. VIII.
76 Wesley-Smith, The Present Constitution, supra note 52, at 9-12.
77 MINERS, supra note 52, at 114. See also, Legislative Council, About LegCo (last modified June 7,
1996), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr95-96/english/about lc/eabout.html. LegCo was established in 1843. It
did not include any Chinese members until 1884. Id
78 MINERS, supra note 52, at 115-16.
" Id See Letters Patent, supra, note 53, art. VI(1) (amended July 1, 1994). Royal Instructions,
supra, note 54, cl. XIIA(1).
Id. See also, Legislative Council, supra note 77.
SI "Functional constituencies" represented various interest groups, such as commercial, industrial,
trade union and educational sectors. Until the 1995 elections when the constituency was broadened, the
number of electors in each sector was comparatively small. MINERS, supra note 52, at 116-118.
82 WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 52, at 138-40. The
Governor was empowered to appoint judges for the courts based in Hong Kong. Letters Patent, supra note
53, art. XIV. This power was regulated by the Legislature, which prescribed the organisation of and
qualifications of appointment to these courts.
83 Id.
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In sum, with the partial exception of the last six years of British
control when the majority of LegCo positions were filled by election, Hong
Kong was ruled undemocratically; its people were largely denied the right
to determine the nature and composition of its institutions of government.
84
This denial culminated in the agreement of the United Kingdom to return
Hong Kong to China 5 without first obtaining the consent of the people of
Hong Kong to that decision, or to the terms upon which the return would
occur.
86
B. Taiwan
1. Taiwan During the Martial Law Period
Until the late 1980's, the people of Taiwan, like those in Hong Kong,
enjoyed little autonomy or accountability." Control of the island passed
from the Japanese" to the KMT government of mainland China at the end
of the Second World War,89 and four years later the KMT retreated there
" Miners claims that the British refrained from introducing democratic forms because such reforms
would have antagonised China. MINERS, supra note 52, at 22-23. However, the failure to accord
democratic rights to the ethnic Chinese people of Hong Kong is consistent with the generally unfavourable
treatment they received at the hands of the British authorities for much of the colonial period. See
generally Richard Klein, Law and Racism in an Asian Setting: An Analysis of the British Rule of Hong
Kong, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. R. 223 (Winter, 1995). Klein highlights the institutionalised
discrimination practised by the British in Hong Kong (id., at 248-59) and laws which implemented racial
segregation (id., at 259-67). Although, many of the worst abuses were remedied after the Second World
War, it was not until 1974 that Cantonese became an official language of equal status with English (id, at
270), despite the fact that Cantonese was the native language of 98% of Hong Kong's population. Further,
even in the 1990's, most senior officials, including the Governor, most judges of the Court of Appeal
(Hong Kong's highest court after the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) and senior bureaucrats,
were Europeans (id, at 267-69).
" See Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, supra note 1.
s6 WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 52, at 55-57. Wesley-
Smith suggests that the people of Hong Kong, as a "distinct community" and a "distinct 'people' should
enjoy the right to self-determination. See also Nihal Jayawickrama, The Right of Self-Determination, in
HONG KONG'S BASIC LAW: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (Peter Wesley-Smith ed., 1990) (raising the
additional argument that the former status of Hong Kong as a non self-governing territory gives its people
a right to self-determination). For the purposes of this article, however, it is sufficient to note that whether
or not the people of Hong Kong should have a right to self-determination, they have not been in a position
to exercise such as right, nor are they likely to be able to do so in the near future.
"7 For a comprehensive description and analysis of the constitutional order in Taiwan from 1945 to
1994, see Hwang, supra, note 51.
U For the history of Taiwan prior to its seizure by the Japanese in 1895, see Chen & Reisman, supra
note 51, at 608-11 (1972); TAIWAN: STUDIES IN CHINESE LOCAL HISTORY (Leonard H. Gordon ed., 1970).
"9 The Japanese did not formally renounce sovereignty over Taiwan until 1952, when the peace
treaty with Japan came into force. See Peace Treaty with Japan, Sep. 8, 1951, 3. U.S.T. 3169 (1952). The
treaty entered into effect on Apr. 28, 1952. Owing to the uncertainty as to which government of China was
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after their defeat on the mainland by the CCP. The KMT ruled Taiwan
under martial law from 1949 to 198790 and established a constitutional order
which was anomalous and irregular in several respects.
First, the constitution 9' imposed on Taiwan during the martial law
period was drafted for the Chinese mainland, and its application to Taiwan
was originally to be delayed because the Taiwanese were perceived to be
politically backward.92 The constitution establishes a state called the
"Republic of China" (ROC) whose boundaries include mainland China and
Outer Mongolia,93 even though since 1949 its effective area has been
confined to Taiwan.94 It sets up an extremely complex system of separation
of powers into five branches (or Yuan), provides for a National Assembly
and a President, and establishes central, provincial and district levels of
government. This system is more suitable for governing a huge nation, such
as China, than a small island like Taiwan.
Second, although the ROC Constitution embodies democratic
principles,95 providing for direct or indirect election to governmental
legitimate (the CCP or the KMT), the Treaty does not specify to which government the Japanese were
surrendering Taiwan. See generally CRAWFORD, supra, note 5 1, at 145-52.
90 Jieyan Fa [Chiehyen Fa][Martial Law] 1934. ROC statutes are available in LIuFA QUANSHU[LIUFA CH'OANSHU][COMPILATION OF THE Six LAWS][hereinafter LIUFA QuANSHu], which are publishedby a variety of Taiwanese publishers (such as Da Zhongguo Tushu Gongsi [Ta Chungkuo T'ushu
Kungszu]) and updated several times each year. Martial law was declared May 20, 1949. Civilians become
subject to the jurisdiction of military courts for many offences (art. 8) and constitutional freedoms, including
those of assembly, association, publication, speech, were subject to suspension by the executive (art. 11). See
Hwang, supra note 51, at 17-30.
" ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [CHUNGHUA JENMIN KUNGHOKUO HSIENFA](Constitution of the Republic of China) (adopted by the National Assembly, Dec. 25, 1946, promulgated bythe National Government Jan. 1 1947, effective Dec. 25, 1947) [hereinafter XIANFA [R.O.C.].]. For an
overview of the history and structure of this Constitution, see generally, Lin Chi-tung & Herbert H.P. Ma,The Constitution and Government of the Republic of China, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 88 (1992).
'2 GEORGE KERR, FORMOSA BETRAYED 239-40 (1965).
Article 4 provides that the original boundaries of the ROC cannot be altered except by resolution
of the National Assembly (which has not occurred). xIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 4. The original boundaries arethose areas claimed to be part of Chinese territory by the KMT at the time the ROC Constitution entered
into force and still appear on official maps published in Taiwan.
' The ROC Constitution applied to the so-called "free-area" which includes Taiwan itself, thePescadores Islands and Matsu and Kinmen, two small islands off the coast of Taiwan which are technically
part of Fujian, rather than Taiwan province.
" Hwang, supra note 5 1, at 54-56. The ROC Constitution is based on the thought of Sun Yat-sen
and is an amalgam of different political traditions-liberal democratic, socialist, and imperial Chinese. SeeSUN YAT-SEN, THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF THE PEOPLE, (translated by Frank W. Price, 1990); Piero Tozzi,
Note: Constitutional Reform on Taiwan: Fulfilling a Chinese Notion of Democratic Sovereignty?, 64FORDHAM L. REV. 1193, 1216-24 (Dec. 1995); Lin Chi-tung & Herbert H.P. Ma, supra note 90 at 88-91;Winston Hsiao, The Development of Human Rights in the Republic of China on Taiwan: Ramifications of
Recent Democratic Reforms and Problems of Enforcement, 5 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 161, 166-67 (1995).
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institutions96 and an extensive bill of rights, 97 its normal operation was
suspended from 1948 until 1991 by the National Assembly's adoption of the
Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Mobilisation for the
Suppression of the Communist Rebellion ("Temporary Provisions").9" These
granted powers to the President of the Republic of China (then Chiang Kai-
shek), which would have otherwise been unconstitutional.99 Such powers
included taking emergency measures without being subject to the normal
checks provided by the Legislative Yuan,' serving more than two
consecutive terms,'0 ' creating extra-constitutional agencies'0 2 and prescribing
the means for filling casual vacancies in the ROC's three elected
"parliaments," the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control
Yuan. 
0 3
Third, the articles in the ROC Constitution providing for re-election of
the three "parliaments" were suspended by the Council of Grand Justices, the
96 E.g., XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 27 (election of President and Vice-President by National Assembly) art.
28 (elections for National Assembly), art. 64 (elections for Legislative 'Yuan' [Organ]). The National
Assembly and Legislature have different functions, in accordance with Sun Yat-sen's theories: the National
Assembly exercises the people's political powers (election, recall, initiative and referendum) while the
Legislative Yuan exercises legislative power. See XIANFA [R.O.C.] arts. 25 and 62; SUN YAT-SEN, supra
note 95, at 130-49. Note that President Lee Teng-hui has decided to dismantle the system of provicincial
government. Taiwan Less Provincial, ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 1997, at 35.
'7 XIANFA [R.O.C.] ch. II. See Hsiao, supra note 95 at 168-69.
n Adopted by the National Assembly Apr. 18, 1948, promulgated by the National Government, May
10, 1948, (translated in MAJOR STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA VOL I, 33, Judicial Yuan, Republic
of China), reconfirmed by National Assembly Mar. I1, 1954 [hereinafter Temporary Provisions]. See
Hwang, supra note 51, at 32-44; Tozzi, supra note 95, at 1235-38; Hsiao, supra note 95 at 174-80.
" The Temporary Provisions were further amended in 1966 to grant still wider powers to the
President.
"0o Temporary Provisions, arts. I and 2; compare XIANFA [R.O.C.] arts. 39 and 43.
101 Temporary Provisions, art. 3; compare XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 47.
102 Temporary Provisions, art. 4 (enabling the creation of the National Security Council outside the
normal cabinet structure).
103 Temporary Provisions, art 6 (added to Temporary Provisions in 1966 and amended 1972, in
response to Interpretation 31, see infra, note 105 and accompanying text); see Hungdah Chiu,
Constitutional Development in the Republic of China, in IN THE SHADOW OF CHINA: POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN TAIWAN SINCE 1949, 28-3 l( Steve Tsang ed., 1993) [hereinafter IN THE SHADOW OF
CHINA]; compare XIANFA [R.OC.] arts 26, 64 and 91. Prior to the enactment of Additional Articles (see
infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text), the Control Yuan exercised the powers of consent,
impeachment, censure and auditing. XIANFA [R.O.C.], art. 90. The National Assembly, Legislative Yuan
and Control Yuan were all held to be the equivalents of parliaments in liberal democratic countries.
Council of Grand Justices, Interpretation 76. The decisions of the Council of Grand Justices, Taiwan's
Constitutional Court, are known as "interpretations" and are published in the LIUFA QUANSHU, supra note
90; see F. Fraser Mendel, Judicial Power & Illusion: The Republic of China's Council of Grand Justices
and Constitutional Interpretation, 2 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 157 (1993). There is no official English
translation and translations here are the author's own.
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judicial organ charged with interpreting the Constitution.0 4  In 1954, the
Council held in Interpretation 31 ,o that owing to the defeat of the KMT in the
Chinese Civil War, which the Grand Justices referred to as "the occurrence of
a great misfortune" ffasheng zhongda biangu], no general elections for any
central governmental organs were to be held until the electorates on the
Chinese mainland were regained from the CCP. This ruling continued in
effect until 1990, even though it was clear by the end of the 1950s that the
CCP could not be driven from the mainland.'0 6 Although death or retirement
of members led to casual vacancies filled largely by people born in Taiwan,
in 1989 the majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan and the National
Assembly were still held by people elected on the Chinese mainland. 107 As
the National Assembly elected the President,'0 8 the quasi-permanent majority
of mainland KMT members ensured the President would hold power without
reference to the wishes of the people of Taiwan.0 9 Moreover, the National
Assembly was also the institution empowered to amend the Constitution"0
104 XIANFA [R.O.C.] arts 78, 79 & 173; on the Council of Grand Justices, see generally Lawrence
Shao-liang Liu, Judicial Review and the Emerging Constitutionalism: the Uneasy Case for the Republic of
China on Taiwan, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 509 (1991); Jyh-pin Fa, Constitutional Developments in Taiwan: the
Role of the Council of Grand Justices, 40 INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 198 (1991). For developments occurring
after these two articles were written, see Sean Cooney, Taiwan's Emerging Liberal Democracy and the
New Constitutional Review, in ASIAN LAWS THROUGH AUSTRALIAN EYES (Veronica Taylor ed., 1997). LIN
ZmYl, QUANLi FENLI YU XIANZHENG FAZHAN [CH'OANLI FENLI YU HSIENCHENG FACHAN] [THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT] Ch. 1, (I 993).
105 This interpretation referred only to the Legislative and Control Yuan but its reasoning was later
extended to the National Assembly. Interpretation 31 and other interpretations of the Council of Grand
Justices referred to in this article are available in LIUFA QUANSHU, supra note 90. There are no official
translations into English.
106 Steve Tsang, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang's Policy to Reconquer the Chinese
Mainland 1949-1958, in IN THE SHADOW OF CHINA, supra note 103.
"0' Hwang, supra note 51, at 47-50. Beginning in 1969, "supplementary elections" were held to fill
the casual vacancies; candidates elected in 1969 were not subject to re-election but candidates from 1972
were. Hungdah Chiu, supra note 103, at 29-30. In 1989, only 10.55% of National Assembly seats were
filled by Taiwanese supplementary elections, and only 34.12% of Legislative Yuan seats and 41.5 1% of
Control Yuan members were filled by Taiwanese supplementary elections (owing to the election of a
number of representatives for overseas Chinese, the total percentage of members elected to the Control
Yuan through supplementary elections was 60.38%). Hwang, at 50. (The math in the original source has
been corrected.).1OS XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 27.
109 If elections to the National Assembly had been held in the early years of KMT rule on Taiwan,
they would quite likely have seen its defeat, since the KMT members had been elected on the mainland
and, in the years immediately after the flight to Taiwan, lacked a popular base on the island. The loss of
the KMT majority in the National Assembly could well have led to the defeat of President Chiang, the
KMT leader. It was therefore clear to the KMT leadership that, if the electorate was to be confined to
Taiwan, elections for the central organs of government must be avoided.
11 XIANFA [R.O.C.], art. 174. Amendments can be proposed either by the National Assembly or
by the Legislative Yuan. See infra, note 199 and accompanying text.
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and refused to consider doing so until mainland China was recovered."' The
Taiwanese could not, therefore, effect constitutional change.
Fourth, as Interpretation 31 suggests, the judiciary, particularly the
Council of Grand Justices, legitimated, rather than constrained, the excesses
of KIT rule."' Since the President appointed the Grand Justices for
renewable nine-year terms," 3 he could ensure that they remained compliant.
On only one occasion prior to the 1980's did the Council suggest that a law
was unconstitutional, and this decision was disregarded by the Executive and
Legislative Yuan.'
There are many similarities between Taiwan during the martial law
period and Hong Kong during its period as a British colony. Although Hong
Kong was ruled as a colony and Taiwan as a part of the "Republic of China,"
the Taiwanese were in many ways treated as though they had been
colonised.' In both cases, a constitutional structure was imposed from
outside without reference to popular opinion, and it could not be amended by
democratic processes. In both cases, the dominant branch of government was
the executive, whose head held wide powers, and was not subject to popular
election." 6  In both cases, the legislature was largely unaccountable to the
people.' Ultimate judicial authority over the constitutional structure was not
exercised both independently and within the jurisdiction (internally)--in
Hong Kong, it was exercised independently, but externally, by the Privy
Council; and in Taiwan, it was exercised internally, but essentially to confirm
KMT rule.
While developing the OCTS model, the PRC might reasonably have
viewed it as an advance on the constitutional practices just described, since it
offers a "high degree of autonomy" in the exercise of legislative, executive
I Hwang, supra note 51, at 60.
12 See Liu, supra note 104, at 557. He attributes this inaction to the "authoritarian political
atmosphere," its reluctance to antagonise the executive and legislative branches, and procedural and
jurisdictional limitations contained in the Council Law.
1 XIANFA [R.O.C.], art. 79 and Sifayuan Zuzhi Fa [Szufaytlan Tsuchih Fa][Organic Law of the
Judicial Yuan], art. 5, available in LIuFA QUANSHU, supra note 90.
14 Hwang, supra note 51, at 184-85. Interpretation 86 questioned the constitutionality of locating
lower courts within the executive rather than the judicial branch of government. However, it did not
specifically declare the practice unconstitutional and was not acted upon for 20 years. Liu, supra note 104, at
527.
I' Hwang, supra note 51, at61.
116 Except in the sense that a minority of the National Assembly were, from 1969, elected in
Taiwan and participated in the process of appointing the President. Supra note 107.
17 Until the 1990's in Hong Kong's case.
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and judicial powers, and increased accountability. However, OCTS has been
overtaken by radical reform in Taiwan.
2. Democratisation
Between 1986 and 1996, the system of government in Taiwan changed
from an authoritarian regime to a liberal democratic state. The reasons for
this change and the main events in the process have been extensively
analysed elsewhere." 8  Five key reforms are discussed here. They are the
lifting of martial law, the abolition of the Temporary Provisions, the revision
of the ROC Constitution, the introduction of full elections for the National
Assembly, the Legislature and the Presidency, and the increasing independent
activism of the judiciary." 9
In 1986, opponents of the KMT who had previously been informally
organised as the "dangwai" ("[Personalities] outside the party" 20 ), formed
the Democratic Progressive Party ("DPP"). This proved to be a catalyst for
radical political change. The KMT government initially declared the party
I[$ E.g., CONTENDING APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TAIWAN (Edwin A. Winckler
and Susan Greenhalgh eds, 1988); HUNG-MAO TIEN, THE GREAT TRANSITION: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1989); CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE FUTURE OF THE REPUBLIC
OF CHINA (Harvey J. Feldman ed., 1991); Hermann Halbeisen, In Search of a New Political Order?
Political Reform in Taiwan; Hung-mao Tien, Dynamics of Taiwan's Democratic Transition; and Fu Hu,
The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan, all in IN THE SHADOW OF CHINA, supra note
103; J. Bruce Jacobs, Democratisation in Taiwan, 17 ASIAN STUD. REV. 116 (1993); Thomas B. Gold,
Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest for Identity, in CULTURAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR TAIWAN (Stevan Harrell
& Huang Chln-chieh eds, 1994); Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu, Taiwan's Domestic Political Reforms,
Institutional Change and Power Realignment in TAIWAN IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC IN THE 1990S, (Gary
Klintworth ed 1994); STEPHAN HAGGARD & ROBERT R. KAUFMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS, Ch.8, esp. 292-299 (1995); Hwang, supra note 51, at 79-251 (Hwang provides
a useful table setting out the chronology of events between 1986 and 1994 at 146-52). These studies
generally link the changes to factors such as: (1) the development of a prosperous, well-educated, and
increasingly urbanised population (sharing the island's wealth relatively equitably) desirous of political
change; (2) the growing sophistication of opposition forces, who enjoyed increasing success participating in
supplementary and local government elections; (3) internal reform of the KMT, including the replacement of
many first generation mainland KMT leaders by people born on Taiwan who were more concerned with
Taiwanese socio-economic development than with the dream of recovering China, as well as the pursuit of
pro-democracy policies by President Chiang Ching-kuo in his later years; (4) confidence within the KMT that
it could implement incremental reforms while limiting the opposition's room for manoeuvre and retaining
power; and (5) external factors including the increasing diplomatic isolation of the KMT regime, economic
reform on the Chinese mainland and the impact of democratisation in the Philippines and South Korea.
19 The account here draws on the references in the preceding footnote, particularly Hwang, supra
note 51, at 79-251.
120 L.e., the KMT. See generally Jilrgen Domes, The Kuomintang and the Opposition, in IN THE
SHADOW OF CHINA, supra note 103, at 123-26.
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illegal, but took no further action.' 21 In the following year, President Chiang
Ching-kuo formally lifted martial law.122  As a result, new political parties
could be formed legally, 123 civilians were no longer subject to military
trials, 124and restrictions on assembly, association, publication and speech
were eased. 1
25
In the wake of the political liberalisation following the lifting of martial
law, a process of Constitutional reform commenced. 26  In 1990, the Council
of Grand Justices revised Interpretation 31 and held that "considering the
current national situation" [zhenzhuo dangqian guoqing], new general
elections for the national parliaments must be conducted. 27  The Grand
Justices further held that the persons eligible to vote could be determined
without regard to those articles in the ROC Constitution which provided that
the electorate include the Chinese mainland. 2  This meant that the electorate
could be confined to Taiwan.1
29
In April 1991, the National Assembly abolished the Temporary
Provisions, 130 restoring normal constitutional order, and amended the ROC
Constitution so that its operation was, for electoral purposes, confined to the
23 Id. at 126.
12 Martial law was lifted on July 15, 1987.
13 Political parties are now regulated by the Renmin Tuanti Fa [Civic Organisation Law] Ch. 9,
which was amended in 1992 to remove the reference to the Temporary Provisions. The law prohibits civic
organisations from advocating independence [zhuzhang fenlie guotu], but this has not been effectively
enforced against the DPP.
124 Hwang, supra note 5 l, at 158.
125 Id. at 155, 159, 162-74. For an official U.S. assessment of Human Rights on Taiwan, see U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TAIWAN HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1995 (1996) available in Lexis, World
Library, ALLWLD File. While noting a range of problems, the report states that "[tihe Taiwan authorities
generally respect the human rights of citizens." Id. at 2. For an analysis of human rights in contemporary
Taiwan, see Hsiao, supra note 95 at 180-187.
126 In 1990, President Lee Teng-hui (elected President by the National Assembly on Mar. 21 of that
year) convened a National Affairs Conference (held from June 28 to July 4). This was the first time that
the divergent opinions on constitutional reform in Taiwanese society could be publicly discussed and the
Conference had a major impact on the reform process. Participants included academics, journalists, and
business leaders as well as KMT, DPP and other political figures. Although opinions were divided on
constitutional reform, general consensus was achieved on several major issues, such as the abolition of the
Temporary Provisions and the need for general elections for the National Assembly and the Legislative
Yuan. Chiu, supra note 103, at 33-37. However, the reform agenda remained under KMT control.
Hwang, supra note 5 1, at 141-45; HAGGARD & KAUFMAN, supra note 118, at 299.
327 Interpretation 261. Hwang describes this decision as "the greatest contribution that the Council
of Grand Justices has ever made to democratic reform." Hwang, supra note 51, at 235.
322 Id. See XIANFA [R.O.C.], arts 26 (National Assembly), 64 (Legislative Yuan) & 91 (Control
Yuan).
129 The area under control of the ROC/Taiwan government includes the Pescadores Islands (which are
part of "Taiwan Province") and two small islands, Kinmen and Matsu, that are technically part of Fujian
province.
130 Abolished Apr. 22, 1991, abolition promulgated by the President May 1, 1991.
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Taiwan area.' 3' The amendments preserve the Constitution's original text'32
but modify it through "Additional Articles." The Additional Articles were
themselves amended by the National Assembly in 1992 and again in 1994. 31
These reforms have democratised the Taiwanese political system in the
following ways:
(1) All members of the National Assembly are now elected for
four year terms in competitive 134  elections. 135  With the
exception of a small number of members representing Chinese
abroad, National Assembly members are Taiwanese people
.elected in Taiwan under universal suffrage.136 Elections for the
National Assembly were held in 1991 and 1996. The National
Assembly no longer appoints the President and Vice
President 137  but retains its important power to amend the
Constitution. 3  Constitutional change cannot now proceed
unless both of the major parties agree to it, as the main
opposition party, the DPP, gained more than thirty percent of
131 Amendments passed by National Assembly on 21 April, 1991, promulgated by the President
May 1, 1991.
132 This is to maintain the goal of applying the ROC Constitution to the mainland if reunification is
achieved. Hwang, supra note 51, at 134-41.
133 For a critical evaluation of the Additional Articles and the amendments to them, see id at 209-
52. Further constitutional amendments are likely in 1997 following the all-party National Development
Conference held in Taipei December 23-28, 1996. After a walkout by Taiwan's third largest party, the
New Party, both the KMT and the DPP reached agreement on issues including redefining the relationship
between the various branches of government, and reforming the method of election and powers of the
National Assembly. Susan Yu, Conference Maps Shift in Presidential and Legislative Relations, FREE
CHINA J., Jan. 4, 1997 at 1.
134 Elections in Taiwan may be described as relatively free and fair; the KMT still enjoys massive
financial advantages over the opposition, and unfair access to the free-to-air television. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, supra note 125, at 10.
135 XIANFA [R.O.C.]; Additional Articles art. 1 § I (1994) [hereinafter AA]. On July 28, 1994, the
ROC Constitution was amended by 10 Additional Articles. Jefri Jay Ruchti, Taiwan (Republic of China),
in 19 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 41-51 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz
eds., 1995).
136 Id. All citizens of the ROC on Taiwan who attain the age of 20 years may vote unless they lack
legal capacity or are deprived of the right to vote (other than because of political offences committed under
martial law). XIANFA [R.O.C.], art. 130; Gongzhi Renyuan Xuanju Bamian Fa [Kungchih Jenyilan
Hsflanchel Pamian Fa][Law on the Election and Recall of Public Officials] art. 14, available in LIUFA
QUANSHU, supra note 90. There are further restrictions on persons standing for election (such as that the
person may not be bankrupt), but these are no longer of a political nature. XIANFA [R.O.C.] art.130;
Gongzhi Renyuan Xuanju Bamian Fa [Kungchih Jenyflan Hstlancho Pamian Fa] art.34.
137 AA art. 2 §1 (1994).
1 AA art. 1 §2(4) (1994); id art. 1 §2 (1994). The remaining powers are to elect a Vice-President
if the office falls vacant, to .recall or impeach the President and Vice-President, and to confirm
appointments to the Judicial Yuan, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan.
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the votein the 1996 election, and a successful constitutional
amendment requires the consent of seventy-five percent of the
National Assembly members. 3 9
(2) All members of the Legislative Yuan are now elected for
three year terms in competitive elections and are almost
entirely Taiwanese people elected in Taiwan. 4 ' General
elections were held in 1992 and 1995, and the KMT, whose
vote in the 1995 election fell below fifty percent for the first
time, holds only a bare (and often unworkable) majority."'
(3) Some rationalisation of the complex constitutional
structure has begun. 4 2 There are now only two "parliaments"
instead of three. Members of the Control Yuan, formerly
elected, are now appointed by the President with the consent of
the National Assembly. 4 3 The Council of Grand Justices has
ruled that, as a result of this change, the Control Yuan is no
longer to be considered a parliamentary institution' and
instead operates now as a constitutionally established
independent commission of audit, censure, and impeachment of
public officials."'
(4) The President and Vice President are also directly elected
for four years in competitive elections by the people of
Taiwan.146 They may be elected for no more than two terms.'4 7
13 The quorum requirement is two-thirds. XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 174. At the 1996 election, the
DPP won 99, or 30% of the 334 National Assembly seats. Dennis Engarth, Lee to Focus on Home Affairs,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 24, 1996.
140 AA art. 3 (1994).
341 The KMT gained 46% of the vote in the 1995 Legislative Yuan elections, the DPP gained 33%
and the New Party 13%. Dennis Engarth, Result Aids Lee's Presidential Bid, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Dec. 4, 1995, at 8. The KMT enjoyed a majority of six immediately after the elections (the KMT won 85
seats, the DDP 54, the New Party 2 I,and Independents 4). CHINA NEWS, Dec. 3, 1995 at 1. However, after
the elections, two KMT members representing indigenous people resigned from the KMT and joined the
independent grouping in the Parliament. CHINA NEWS, Feb. 7, 1996, at i.
142 Further simplification of the constitutional structure, including the "downscaling" of the
provincial government, was proposed at the 1996 National Development Conference. Yu, supra note 133,
at 143 AA art. 6 §2 (1994).
I" Interpretation 325.
145 Although, it is still considered to be one of the five branches of government. id.
1'4 AA art. 2 §§1, 6 (1994).
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The first direct presidential elections were held in 1996 and
won by the KMT candidates Lee Teng-hui and Lien Chan.Y18
The extraordinary powers conferred on the President by the
Temporary Provisions have been abolished; his or her powers
are now regulated by the ROC Constitution and the Additional
Articles. 149  The Premier (the "President of the Executive
Yuan") and Cabinet are appointed by the President. 5°
(5) Decisions relating to the dissolution of political parties on
constitutional grounds have been transferred from the
executive to the judicial branch.'5 '
As their decision to require parliamentary elections suggests, the
reform of the constitutional system has been accompanied by a changed
approach on the part of the Council of Grand Justices.' The Grand
Justices have been far more prepared to make declarations of
unconstitutionality, 53  usually on the basis of inconsistency with the
fundamental rights set out in Chapter II of the ROC Constitution. The
47 AA art. 2 §6 (1994).
14S Lee Sweeps to Victory: Door to Democracy Open, Says President, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 24, 1996. Lee and Chan gained 54% of the vote.
149 XIANFA [R.O.C.] Ch IV; AA art. 2 (1994). Article 2 of the Additional Articles still enables a
President to wield extensive powers; she or he may issue emergency orders (§4) which are subject to the
approval of the Legislative Yuan within 10 days, and she or he may convene a National Security Council to
determine defence policy(§5-this power is not subject to check).
I50 XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 55 §1, art. 56 (1994). The consent of the Legislative Yuan is required for
the appointment of the Premier; these provisions have recently been interpreted by the Council of Grand
Justices. Interpretation 419.
15 Article 4, section 3 of the Additional Articles states: "A political party shall be unconstitutional
if its goals or activities jeopardize the existence of the Republic of China or free, democratic constitutional
order." AA Art. 4 §3 (1994).
Xu Qingxiong argues that both major parties could be said to violate, or at least have violated, this
provision. The opposition DPP (which Xu believes was the primary target of the provision) aim to create an
independent Taiwan, which would mean that the ROC would cease to exist. On the other hand, the KMT
during the martial law era seriously infringed "free democratic constitutional order." XU QINGXIONG, XIANFA
RUMEN [HSIENFA JUMENI[A BASIC GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION], 302-03 (1992). However, the Grand
Justices have not been asked to rule on this matter and it is unlikely that they would adopt an interpretation
that would lead to the dissolution of the major parties.
152 See generally Hwang, supra note 51, at 181-88, 234-38; Hwang Jau-Yuan and Yeh Jiunn-rong,
A Review of Constitutional Change in Taiwan, in ASIA-PACIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL YEARBOOK 1996,(
Graham Hassall and Cheryl Saunders eds, forthcoming 1997) Cooney, supra note 104.
15 Hwang notes that from October 1985 to September 1994, I1 statutes, 17 administrative orders
and 28 court decisions were declared unconstitutional. Hwang, supra note 5 1, at 184-85.
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increase in the number 54 and source'"5 of petitions (i.e. applications) to the
Council also indicates that the institution has gained significant public
stature and confidence.
While the majority of decisions of the Council deal with property and
litigation rights 156 the Grand Justices have also been active in curbing many
of the abuses which were characteristic of the martial law period. 57  They
have asserted control over their own procedure.5 5 They have invalidated
the exercise of discretionary power by the executive if it encroaches on
constitutional rights and lacks a clear legislative basis.' They have struck
down laws that violate constitutional guarantees of freedom from arbitrary
arrest and due process. 6° They have also removed some of the authoritarian-
corporatist controls placed on civil organisations and institutions by the KMT
during the martial law period.' 61  In sum, the Council operates reasonably
effectively as the supervisor of the constitutional order.
The reforms described here have fundamentally altered the nature of
government in Taiwan. 62 Unlike the people of Hong Kong, who were
'3 During its fifth term (from 1985 to 1994), the Council received 2784 petitions, compared to
1145 for the Fourth Council. COUNCIL OF GRAND JUSTICES, JUDICIAL YUAN, THE GRAND JUSTICES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 40 (1995). It rendered far more interpretations (167)
than any previous other term (the next highest figure is 79). Id.
155 During its fifth term, the Council received 97% of its petitions from individuals and 72% of its
interpretations related to those petitions, whereas during the first term of the Council almost two-thirds of
petitions came from government as opposed to individual citizens, and no interpretations were rendered in
relation to the latter. Id at 42.
156 Hwang, supra note 51, at 184 (see Table 4.3 at 183).
157 See Sean Cooney, Arbitrating Reform: Taiwan's Constitutional Court in the Transition to a
Liberal Democratic Political Order, in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN EAST ASIA:
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN EAST ASIA (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., forthcoming 1997).
153 Interpretation 371 (Grand Justices Adjudication Law invalid insofar as it prevented lower courts
from referring cases involving issues of unconstitutionality directly to the Grand Justices).
159 E.g., Interpretation 313 (regulations on air transport containing sanctions were not clearly
authorised by the Civil Aviation Law); Interpretation 384 (administrative rules concerning academic courses
were not authorised by University Law and violated academic freedom); Interpretation 390 (rules
empowering officials to stop work at or close factories were not clearly authorised); Interpretation 394 (rules
made under the Building Law conferred excessively broad enforcement powers on local authorities in relation
to registration procedures).
160 Interpretation (four aspects of the Provisions for the Eradication of Hoodlums found to violate
Article 8); Interpretation 392 ( Code of Criminal Procedure invalid insofar as it empowered prosecutors to
arrest or detain suspects for more than 24 hours without court authorisation); see Hwang & Yeh, supra note
152.
161 Interpretation 373 (ban in Trade Union Law on educational workers organising unions declared
unconstitutional; fundamental collective rights of workers explained); Interpretation 384 (aspects of Education
Department control over university courses unconstitutional under a broad interpretation of constitutional
protection of academic freedom).
162 The Taiwanese political system still suffers many flaws, including political violence and
corruption. Tozzi, supra note 95, at 1245-47; recent dramatic instances include the assassination on Nov.
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handed over to the PRC never having enjoyed autonomy and control over
their constitutional structure, the people of Taiwan now do enjoy such
control.
The OCTS has been predicated on the subordination of the people of
Hong Kong and Taiwan to the central government of the PRC, displacing
their subordination to Britain and the KMT. 163 As the relationship between
the Taiwanese and their government can no longer be characterised as
subordination, the continuity in the nature of government achieved in Hong
Kong is not now possible in Taiwan. The next Part argues that far from
harmonising with the present constitutional framework in Taiwan, OCTS
would destroy it.
IV. THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SAR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
TAIWAN
A. The Structure of Government
1. Autonomy
The Basic Law '64 provides that under PRC rule, the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR") "exercise[s] a high degree of
21, 1996 of Taoyuan Mayor Liu Pangyou and seven others and the murder on Nov. 30, 1996 of DPP
feminist Peng Wanju. Virginia Sheng, Legislature toughens anti-crime laws, FREE CHINA J., Jan. 4, 1997,
at2.
163 For example, during Taiwan's martial law era, at least, Deng Xiaoping saw negotiations for the
reunification of Taiwan taking place between the "two parties," the CCP and the KMT, even though the
KMT at that time did not enjoy a popular mandate. See Deng Xiaoping Tan Zhongguo Dalu he Taiwan
Heping Tongyi Shexiang, RENMIN RIBAO, Jul. 30, 1983, at 1.
16 See generally, BASIC LAW, supra note 38; WANG, HONG KONG 1997, supra note 16, at 63-128;
PETER WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW supra note 52; Albert H Y Chen,
Some Reflections on Hong Kong's Autonomy, 24 HONG KONG L.J. 173 (1994); Yash Ghai, A Comparative
Perspective, in HONG KONG'S BASIC LAW: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (Peter Wesley-Smith, ed. 1990);
Anna M. Han, Hong Kong's Basic Law: The Path to 1997, Paved with Pitfalls, 16 HASTINGS INT'L&
COMP. L. REV. 321 (1993); Anthony Neoh, Opinion of a Scholar: Hong Kong's Future: The View of a
Hong Kong Lawyer, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 309, 330-37 (1992). For a Taiwanese perspective, see WANG
TAYQuAN, XIANGGANG JIBENFA [HSIANGKANG CHIPENFA][THE BASIC LAW OF HONG KONG] (1995)
[hereinafter WANG, XIANGGANG JIBENFA]. On the economic implications of the Basic Law, see John H.
Henderson, The Reintegration of Hong Kong into the People's Republic of China: What It Means to Hong
Kong's Future Prosperity, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 503, 528-32 (1995). Several important studies
relevant to the Basic Law were completed before it was finally promulgated and should be read with
caution, since some of their comments are not applicable to the final draft. See Bundy, supra note 41; THE
BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE (Peter Wesley-Smith & Albert Chen eds., 1988); Cheng, supra
note 41; Chiu, supra note 41; Tamanaha, supra note 16; HANNUM, supra note 13, Ch. 8; MICHAEL C.
DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION IN HONG KONG (1989). For perspectives of PRC members of
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autonomy and enjoy[s] executive, legislative and independent judicial
power, including that of final adjudication, in accordance with the
provisions of this Law."' 65  The areas in which the HKSAR enjoys
independent decision-making power are very broad.' The HKSAR
maintains its own common law legal system;'67 few national PRC laws
apply within it, 6 ' its judicial system is completely independent from that of
the rest of the PRC, 6 9 and the fundamental rights of its people are arguably
better protected. 70  No PRC organ apart from the NPC, its Standing
the Basic Law Drafting Committee, see Zhang Youyu, The Reasons for and Basic Principles in
Formulating the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Basic Law, and its Essential Contents and
Mode of Expression, 2 J. CHINESE L. 5 (1988)(Zhang was the Deputy Chairman of the NPC Legal
Committee and a member of the Basic Law Drafting Committee); Wu Jianfan, Several Issues Concerning
the Relationship between the Central Government of the People's Republic of China and the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region, 2 J. CHINESE L. 65 (1988); Xiao Weiyun, A Study of the Political System of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the Basic Law, 2 J. CHINESE L. 95 (1988); Liu Yiu
Chu, Interpretation and Review of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2 J.
CHINESE L. 49 (1988) (Liu was a Hong Kong based delegate to the NPC).
165 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 2. Its capitalist system and "way of life" are to be preserved for
fifty years. Id at art. 5.
16 They are certainly far broader than other areas ofthe PRC. Compare XIANFA [P.R.C.], (1982),
Ch. I1I Sections 5 and 6. As to whether, compared to other autonomous regions, Hong Kong enjoys a
"high degree" of autonomy, see Albert Chen, The Relationship between the Central Government and the
SAl, in THE BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE, supra note 164, at 108-16; Tamanaha, supra note 16;
WANG, supra note 16, at 89-112.
167 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, arts. 8, 18. For a discussion of the potential conflict of laws issues
arising under OCTS between civil law, common law and socialist law systems. See Jin Huang and Andrew
Xuefeng Qian, "One Country, Two Systems," Three Law Families, and Four Legal Regions: The Emerging
Inter-regional Conflicts of Laws in China, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 289 (1995).
16 The national PRC laws applying to the HKSAR are: (I) the PRC Constitution (although those
provisions dealing with the socialist legal system and the normal structure of regional government do not
apply under XIANFA [P.R.C.], art. 31); (2) provisions of the Basic Law itself (BASIC LAW, supra note 38,
art.18); (3) national laws specified in Annex Ill of the Basic Law, which concern the PRC capital, calendar,
national anthem, national flag, national day, national emblem, territorial sea, nationality, and diplomatic
privileges and immunity (id art. 18), and; (4) interpretations of the Basic Law made by the NPC Standing
Committee (id. art. 158). The purported limited application of the PRC Constitution is problematic. The
Constitution is the fundamental law of the PRC and article 31 does not appear sufficiently specific to
authorise the establishment of a SAR whose capitalist system contradicts other constitutional provisions
(such as the preamble and arts. 1, 5, and 6) which create a socialist system. See Cheng, supra note 41, at
65-72. However, the NPC has decided that the Basic Law is constitutional. Decision of the National
People's Congress on the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China, adopted at the Third Session of Seventh National People's Congress on Apr. 4, 1990,
reprinted in BASIC LAW, supra note 38, at 206.
169 Id. at arts. 2, 19, 81, 82. The courts in the HKSAR do not, however, enjoy final authority in
interpreting the Basic Law, which lies with the NPC Standing Committee. Id. art. 158; see infra notes 313-
317 and accompanying text.
170 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, at 70-73. The Intemational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and various International Labor
Organization ("ILO") conventions made applicable to Hong Kong under British rule continue to apply. Id.
art. 39. Many of these covenants have not been ratified by China and it is unclear how they may be
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Committee and the State Council (the Central People's Government
["CPG"]),'7 ' and no regional government may interfere with the HKSAR's
affairs. 72
In contrast to the rest of China, the HKSAR practices a capitalist,
rather than a socialist economic system. 7 3  The HKSAR's finances are
independent from the CPG, which cannot levy taxes in the HKSAR'7 4 or
require the HKSAR to hand over revenue.' The HKSAR government may
formulate its own monetary and financial policies. 7 6  The region has its
own currency, 17 7 it is a separate customs territory, 7 1 largely controls its own
shipping'79 and civil aviation,' issues its own passports.' and maintains its
own education system," 2 scientific,' 83 cultural, 8 4 sport185 social security,18 6
enforced, or reporting obligations met.. See Nihal Jayawickrama, Human Rights in Hong Kong: The
Continued Applicability of the International Covenants, 25 HONG KONG L. J. 171 (1995) (arguing that the
HKSAR succeeds to the obligation, previously undertaken by the United Kingdom, to make periodic
reports on the enjoyment of the Covenant rights to the UN Human Rights Committee). See generally
Michael Davis, Human Rights and the Founding of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: A
Framework for Analysis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 301 (1996). At the time of writing, the future
status of Hong Kong's Bill of Rights Ordinance 1991 was uncertain. See Sharon Cheung, Warning Given
ofSAR Legal Headache, Jan. 24, 1997. Note that Taiwan, because it is not a state, is not a signatory to the
Covenants. Hsiao, supra note 95, at 184-85. Hsiao argues that it is, however, bound by the customary
international law on human rights. Id. at 188-94.
17 The NPC is the highest organ of state power in the PRC. XIANFA [P.R.C.], art. 57. Together
with its Standing Committee, its permanent body, it exercises the state's legislative power. Id. art. 58. The
NPC is empowered inter alia to amend the Constitution, to supervise its enforcement, to enact basic laws*
and to elect and remove from office the President and the members of the State Council. Id art. 62. The
NPC Standing Committee is empowered inter alia to interpret the Constitution and laws, to enact laws
other than basic laws, and to supervise the work of the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the
Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate. Id. art. 67. The State Council
corresponds to the Central People's Government and is the highest organ of state administration, the
executive body of the NPC. Id art. 85. Note that, as the PRC is a socialist system, the doctrine of
separation of powers does not apply.
17 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 22.
"73 Until 2047. Id. art. 5.
174 The HKSAR has an independent taxation system. Id. art. 108.
15 Id. art. 106.
176 Id. art. 110.
'" Id. art. I 11. The HKSAR government also controls the region's exchange fund. Id. art. 113.
178 Id. art. 116.
17 Id. Ch. V. sec. 3 (special permission is required for warships). Id. art. 126.
[so Id. Ch. V. §4. These provisions contain a number of limitations (which generally involve
sovereignty issues) on the HKSAR government's authority.
"'1 Id. art. 154.
152 Id. arts. 136, 137.
,83 Id. art. 139.
"4 Id. art. 140.
185 Id. art. 143.
186 Id. art 145.
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and labour8 7 policies, as well as regulatory structures for the professions. I"'
It can, to a limited extent, engage in international relations under the name
"Hong Kong, China."' 8
9
If these provisions were applied to Taiwan, its people could clearly,
on one level, continue to enjoy control over many aspects of their social,
economic, legal and political life. Reunification on these terms might, in
fact, lead to relatively little surface change. However, other provisions in
the Basic Law indicate that, in constitutional terms, reunification on the
PRC's terms would significantly reduce Taiwan's autonomy.
First, article 1 of the Basic Law, in stating that the HKSAR "is an
inalienable part of the People's Republic of China," makes clear that the
HKSAR has no sovereignty of its own. The people of Hong Kong are
subject to PRC rule whether or not they so choose. Neither the Basic Law
nor any other PRC legislation gives them the right to secede should they
express such a desire (for example, through a plebiscite).
Second, the Basic Law reflects the unitary structure of the PRC
government set out in the PRC Constitution. 90 The HKSAR is not a state in
a federal system' 9' but rather a "local administrative region" directly under
the authority of the CPG.192  From the PRC's perspective therefore, the
governmental institutions of the HKSAR may not exercise any inherent
power.' 93 They enjoy a high degree of autonomy only because it has been
conferred upon them by the NPC enacting the Basic Law' 94 and they may
exercise any powers not enumerated in the Basic Law only if PRC organs
grant those powers. 195  Furthermore, the people of the HKSAR cannot
17 Id. art. 147.
In Id. art. 142.
99 Id. Ch. VII.
190 See XIANFA [P.R.C.] art. 62 (discussing NPC powers, including to amend PRC constitution and
enact basic statutes, such as the Basic Law etc.); art. 67 (discussing NPC Standing Committee powers,
including to interpret constitution and statutes, amend major statutes and enact lesser laws, and annul laws
made by regional governments which contravene laws made by central government organs, etc.); and art.
89 (discussing State Council powers, including to annul inappropriate decisions of regional government
organs). Chiu, supra note 41, at 85-86.
191 See, e.g., Wu Jianfan, supra note 164, at 73 (Wu was a member of the Hong Kong Basic Law
Drafting Committee); WANG, XIANGGANG JIBENFA, supra note 164, at 25-28, 78-80.
192 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 12.
193 For example, because the Legislative Council's powers are derived entirely from the PRC
central government, it has no residual powers. Zhang, supra note 164, at 7; Wu Jianfan, supra note 164, at
73-74.
194 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 2. See Tamahara, supra note 16, at 42.
195 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 20. The relevant organs are the NPC, the NPC Standing
Committee, and the State Council.
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amend the Basic Law, and therefore cannot change their own constitutional
structure; only the NPC may do so.1I 6 Nor can they resist any constitutional
change'97 or a reduction in their autonomy should the NPC decide to effect
it.
These arrangements would greatly diminish Taiwan's autonomy and
are not at all likely to be feasible on the island. In Hong Kong, the
constitutional changes required for the Basic Law to become operational
were made by the British and PRC governments and did not require nor
receive the consent of the people of Hong Kong. On the other hand, if a
Basic Law of Taiwan is to be implemented in accordance with existing
constitutional procedures in Taiwan, then the ROC Constitution-insofar as
it is the fundamental constitutional document of Taiwan' 9 8-would have to
be repealed and replaced by an enactment of the NPC. Now, the ROC
Constitution may only be altered if an amendment proposal is passed by
three-quarters of the National Assembly, or the Legislative Yuan. 199 It is
almost inconceivable that these bodies would agree to repeal the
Constitution and surrender entire control over the political structure of
Taiwan to the National People's Congress in Beijing.211 Such a surrender,
once made, would be irrevocable. Moreover, as OCTS maintains a unitary
system, the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan would lose the
power to determine definitively even their own composition and functions
(which they might retain if a federal model were adopted). They would then
196 Id. art. 159. The HKSAR may propose an amendment, but the process is very cumbersome:
Amendment bills from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be submitted to the National
People's Congress by the delegation of the Region to the National People's Congress after obtaining the
consent of two-thirds of the deputies of the Region to the National People's Congress, two-thirds of all the
members of the Legislative Council of the Region, and the Chief Executive of the Region.
197 See WANG, XIANGGANG JIBENFA, supra note 164, at 35.I" While according to the original provisions of this constitution, this state includes mainland
China (art. 4), the enactment of the additional articles confining the franchise to the Taiwan area means that
sovereign state is effectively Taiwan. See supra notes 131-133, and accompanying text.
199 XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 174:
Amendments to the Constitution shall be made in accordance with one of the following procedures:
(1) Upon the proposal of one-fifth of the total number of the delegates to the National Assembly
and by a resolution of three-fourths of the delegates present at a meeting having a quorum of
two-thirds of the entire Assembly, the Constitution may be amended [sic].
(2) Upon the proposal of one-fourth of the members of the Legislative Yuan and by a resolution
of three-fourths of the members present at a meeting having a quorum of three-fourths of the
members of the Yuan, an amendment may be drawn up and submitted to the National Assembly
by way of referendum ....
200 Hwang writes that the Taiwanese are "a potential veto" on reform of Taiwan-China relations.
Hwang, supra note 51, at 322; see also Tozzi, supra note 95, at 1243-45.
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exist, not as an expression of the will of the Taiwanese people, but because
of a decision of the NPC.
Indeed, the position of Taiwan under OCTS could be even worse than
that of Hong Kong. In contrast to Hong Kong, where the Joint Declaration,
an agreement binding on China at international law,2 °' may constitute a
check on the NPC's capacity to amend the Basic Law,2"2 there would be no
international restraint on the NPC amending a Basic Law of Taiwan.20 3 As
Wang Tayquan, a professor at National Taiwan University Law School,
concludes:
[U]nder one country two systems, which is constructed upon
the foundations of a unitary system ... Taiwan obviously has
no reason to unite under the PRC's sovereignty and abandon its
current status, consigning itself to a local government, the
limits of whose autonomy is entirely determined by the
People's Republic of China.2° '
2. Accountability
In the unlikely event that the Taiwanese governmental organs
relinquish their authority over their structure to the NPC, what influence
could the people of Taiwan expect to have over NPC decision-making? The
case of Hong Kong is instructive. The Hong Kong representatives
constitute a tiny minority of delegates to the NPC (as do PRC appointed
representatives from Taiwan).20 5 Given the respective populations of Hong
Kong and the rest of the PRC, this outcome is inevitable, regardless of the
nature of the political system. However, there are still further limits on
202 Zhang, supra note 164, at 15.
202 HANNUM, supra note 13, at 136; Yash Ghai, A Comparative Perspective, supra note 164, at 16-
21 . See, contra, Paul Vitrano, Note, Hong Kong 1997: Can the People's Republic of China Be Compelled
to Abide by the Joint Declaration? 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L & EcON. 445 (1995). Vitrano argues that it is
unlikely that the PRC will abide by the Joint Declaration because it considers the UK's claimed
sovereignty over Hong Kong was based on a "Unequal Treaty" and thus void, and because it is unlikely to
accept adjudication or enforcement by a third party, such as the International Court of Justice ("ICF'). The
PRC has rejected Britain's proposal to refer the legality of its "provisional legislature" to the ICJ. Chris
Yeung, UK Challenges Provisional Body: Let International Court of Justice Settle Legality of Shadow
Legislature, Britain Urges, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 21, 1996 at 1; see infra note 297-298.
203 See Chiu, supra note 41, at 90-91.
M4 WANG, XIANGGANG JIBENFA, supra note 164, at 28; see also Chiu, supra note 41, at 89.
205 The Eighth National People's Congress has 2920 delegates. ZHONGGUO NIANJIAN [CHUNGKUO
NIENCHIEN] [CHINA YEARBOOK], 23 (1995). There are 26 Hong Kong delegates. Ren Xin, A Beginning
for Democracy in Hong Kong, BEIJING REV., Jan 13-19, 1997, p.5.
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accountability of the NPC to Hong Kong. While the Basic Law provides
that the residents of the HKSAR may elect deputies to the NPC,2 °s the Law
does not stipulate whether these elections are to be competitive and open.
However, as the PRC is not a multi-party democracy (at least insofar as that
system is understood in liberal democracies)," 7 elections for NPC members
in the rest of China lack these characteristics. Thus, viewpoints in Hong
Kong which are critical of PRC central government goals may not be
adequately represented in the NPC.
This concern is substantiated by the PRC's approach to constituting
bodies responsible for the drafting and implementation of the Basic Law.
Hong Kong representatives on the Basic Law Drafting Committee and its
advisory body, the Basic Law Consultative Committee, both of which were
established in 1985 to prepare the Basic Law,208 were not elected. They
were appointed from conservative business and professional 61ites, who
were, at best, generally lukewarm on democratic reform.20 9 The Basic Law,
does not, therefore, necessarily reflect the will of the majority people of
Hong Kong who were not able to select representatives democratically for
the key decision-making bodies.
Furthermore, the lack of democratic participation in decision-making
is not confined to the drafting of the Law, but extends to its implementation.
The membership of the Basic Law Committee,2 10 which is the key advisory
206 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 2 1.
207 In a reply to the U.S. 1995 Human Rights Report, the Information Office of the PRC State
Council issued an article rejecting U.S. allegations that China was a "one-party autocracy" and stating that
"over the past decades, China has practised multi-party co-operation led by the communist party. "(emphasis added). Reported in China Refutes US Human Rights Report, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 28,
1996, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, ALLNWS File. Competitive elections have been introduced
at the local level. Id.
203 Ming Chan, Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making of the Hong Kong Basic Law,
1985-90, in THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR 'STABILITY AND PROSPERITY' UNDER CHINESE
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 38, at 4. The Basic Law Drafting Committee ("BLDC") consisted of 36
mainland members and 23 Hong Kong members; the Basic Law Consultative Committee consisted of 180
members from Hong Kong. Id at 7.
20 Id. at 7-8. However, the NPC appointed two pro-democratisation activists, Martin Lee andSzeto Wah to the BLDC. WANG, HONG KONG 1997, supra note 164, at 67; Chiu, supra note 41, at 88.
The BLDC was responsible to the NPC, not to the people of Hong Kong.
210 Established by the Decision of the National People's Congress to Approve the Proposal by the
Drafting Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on the
Establishment of the Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh's
National People's Congress, Apr. 4, 1990 [hereinafter Decision on Committee for the Basic Law].
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body to the NPC and its Standing Committee on the Law's modification, 21
is appointed rather than elected.2 12
This form of representation is a poor alternative to the control the
people of Taiwan currently enjoy over the institutions in Taiwan
empowered to determine the island's constitutional structure. The National
Assembly and the Legislative Yuan2 13 are accountable to the Taiwanese
people because their members are selected through regular, direct, open,
competitive elections. Since constitutional amendments require a super-
majority to succeed and since no one political party can command such a
super-majority, no amendments will occur without the consent of the
representatives of both major parties, which enjoy the support of an
overwhelming majority of Taiwanese people.2 4 The contrast between this
level of popular control over constitutional matters and that exercised by the
people of Hong Kong over the content of the Basic Law thus provides a
further reason for the Taiwanese to reject OCTS.
The discussion so far in this part has identified a fundamental reason
why OCTS cannot be feasibly implemented in contemporary Taiwan-the
transfer of ultimate authority over constitutional matters to the NPC denies
the Taiwanese the right they currently enjoy to conclusively determine their
governmental framework. This in itself is sufficient for OCTS to be
unworkable. However, a Basic Law of Taiwan is also likely to be rejected
because of its substantive content. The following discussion examines how
the Basic Law of Hong Kong deals with the exercise by the HKSAR of
executive, legislative and judicial power and compares this position to
Taiwan. The Basic Law of Hong Kong was drafted with the colonial
governmental structure in mind and the detailed workings of a "Taiwan
Special Administrative Region" would no doubt be considerably different.
2,1 The Committee is responsible for advising the Standing Committee of the NPC, or the NPC
itself, on the invalidation of HKSAR laws, the addition or deletion of national PRC laws applicable in the
HKSAR under Annex IIl of the Basic Law, and the interpretation and amendment of the Basic Law: BASIC
LAW, supra note 38, arts. 17,18, 158, 159.
212 It consists of twelve members appointed by the NPC Standing Committee. The six Hong Kong
members are appointed on the nomination of the HKSAR Chief Executive, the President of the Legislative
Council, and the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal. Decision on the Committee for the Basic Law,
supra note 38, art. 4. Tamanaha sees this body as "a legitimizing mechanism for the Standing Committee
when imposing its will contrary to the will of the government of Hong Kong." Tamanaha, supra note 16,
•at 56.213 The Legislative Yuan may propose constitutional amendments, which the National Assembly
then votes on by way of "referendum." XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 174.
214 See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, what is likely to be similar is the relationship between the
central PRC government and the "SAR."
B. Executive Power
Under the Basic Law, the HKSAR is vested with executive power.2t 5
However, the exercise of that power is subject to constraints imposed by the
national PRC government. The Basic Law both limits the HKSAR
executive's autonomy and requires that the executive be accountable to the
CPG. This is achieved in particular through the provisions concerning the
function and appointment of the Chief Executive, the person in whom
executive power is concentrated.
Control over the Chief Executive ensures command over the key
operations of the HKSAR government. The Chief Executive is head of the
HKSAR government216 and represents the region.217 He or she plays a key
role in staffing the executive and judicial branches, through nominating or
recommending the removal of key officials to the CPG,218 appointing and
removing judges219 and other holders of public office220 as well as members
of the Executive Council, 221 the quasi-Cabinet which assists the Chief
Executive in policy making.222 The Chief Executive's functions include
implementing the laws of the HKSAR,223 signing and promulgating laws, 224
deciding on government policies,225 conducting external affairs where
authorised by the CPG,226 and approving HKSAR budgetary measures. 227
An analysis of the Chief Executive's autonomy and accountability is thus
crucial to determining the status of executive government as a whole.
215 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, arts. 2, 16.
216 Id. arts. 48(1), 60.
217 Id. art. 43.
212 Id. art. 48(5). These officials are the Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Departments,
Directors of Bureaux, the Commissioner Against Corruption, Director of Audit, Commissioner of Police,
Director of Immigration and Commissioner of Customs and Excise. See also id. art. 6 1.
219 Id. art. 48(6). This is subject to procedures discussed infra.
22o Id art. 48(7).
n)' Id. art. 55.
2 Id. arts. 54, 56.
M Id. art. 48(2).
224 Id art. 48(3).
2 Id art. 48(4).
2 Id. art. 48(9).
SId. arts. 48(10) & 62.
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1. Autonomy
The Chief Executive's policy-making autonomy,- and that of his or
her government is limited in several ways. First, the Chief Executive is
obliged to implement CPG directives. 228 There are no mechanisms set out
in the Basic Law which would enable the Chief Executive to challenge the
validity of the directives even where those directives may violate the
autonomy provisions in the Basic Law. 29 If the directive power were
exercised frequently by the CPG, it would permit the CPG to dominate the
Chief Executive and the HKSAR government.
Second, the Chief Executive and her or his government can act only
within the scope of authority conferred on the HKSAR by the Basic Law.23°
The Basic Law sets out a range of policies that the HKSAR must follow.
For example, the HKSAR must take the low tax levels pursued under the
British as a reference for its own taxation system,23' it must preserve Hong
Kong's status as an international financial centre, 32 it must safeguard the
operation of financial markets,2 33 impose no foreign exchange control
policies and allow the free flow of capital within and in and out of the Hong
Kong,234 and maintain free trade.235 These policies may or may not be
desirable in themselves, 2 36  However, the point is that the HKSAR
authorities may not change them, even if they perceive it is in the public
interest and there is a clear majority of people of Hong Kong who wish
them to do SO. 2
37
Both of these restraints on autonomy if applied to Taiwan would
reduce the existing powers of executive government. The structure of
executive government in Taiwan is quite different from that in Hong Kong
223 Id. art. 48 (8).
22 Chen, supra note 164, at 177.
230 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 16.
231 Id art. 108.
232 Id. art. 109.
233 Id. art. 110.
234 Id. art. 112.
235 Id art. 115.
236 They are clearly intended to preserve the economic status quo in Hong Kong and have been
imposed in accordance with the Joint Declaration on Hong Kong, supra note 1, at * 17.
237 Yash Ghai comments on these economic provisions: "One can therefore say that an important
function of the separateness of Hong Kong is to safeguard an economic system, not necessarily to confer
autonomy on the people of Hong Kong." Yash Ghai, A Comparative Perspective, supra note 164, at 10.
There are similar limitations in the Basic Law on the extent to which the government can regulate
educational, scientific, cultural, sporting, religious, labour and social service activities. BASIC LAW, supra
note 38, Ch. VI.
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under both British and PRC rule, so a direct comparison is not possible.
There is no one figure who is the head of both the "state" and the
government. The head of state in Taiwan is the President,2 38 but executive
power in Taiwan is vested in the Executive Yuan, 239 whose head, appointed
by the President with the consent of the Legislative Yuan, is the -Premier.240
Between them, they exercise similar powers to the Chief Executive of the
HKSAR,24' including the appointment of the Cabinet.242 The division of
responsibility between the President and the Premier has in practice become
blurred and controversial.243 Nevertheless, this complexity does not alter
two significant facts.
First, the executive structure in Taiwan is not currently subject to
outside direction, and this would not be the case if the approach in the Hong
Kong Basic Law were followed in Taiwan. Second, in contrast to its
counterpart in the HKSAR, the executive in Taiwan is not required at
present to implement specific policies. The Constitution does contain
statements of fundamental national policies,2" but according to Taiwanese
constitutional scholars these are guidelines only; they are not binding on the
executive and cannot be enforced in a court.245
The PRC's White Paper on Taiwan promises that upon reunification
under OCTS, Taiwan would be able to regulate its own political and
military affairs [... zheng, jun, ... shiyi dou zixing guanli].246 This indicates
that Taiwan would enjoy more governmental autonomy than Hong Kong.
Certainly, the Hong Kong SAR does not have its own military forces.247
However, the promise is extremely vague. Does it mean that the executive
in Taiwan will not be subject to the same controls as that in Hong Kong, or
that it may retain the current structure of the executive (a President and
Premier instead of a Chief Executive), or both, or neither? It is difficult to
238 XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 35. See generally Ch. IV and AA art. 2 (1994).
239 XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 53.
240 Also referred to as President of the Executive Yuan id. arts 54 & 55.
241 See XIANFA [R.O.C.] Ch. IV, V, and AA art 2 (1994).
242 Id.; XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 56.
243 With the enactment of article 2 of the Additional Articles (introducing direct presidential
elections and strengthening presidential powers), Taiwan seems to be gravitating towards a semi-
presidential or presidential system of government. See Hwang, supra note 51, at 232-34, 240-49. Matters
are further complicated because the current Vice-President, Mr Lien Chan, is also the Premier. This was
challenged as unconstitutional by several legislators. The Council of Grand Justices, although ruling that
the arrangement was constitutional, questioned whether it was appropriate. Interpretation 419.
24 XIANFA [R.O.C.] Ch XIII; AA, art. 9 (1994).
245 See LIN ZIYI, supra note 104, at 156-160.
246 TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE AND INFORMATION OFFICE, supra note 3, at v (Chinese version at 16).
247 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 14.
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reconcile the Taiwanese executive authorities enjoying freedom from CPG
direction with a unitary political system where the CPG "exercise[s the
power of ] unified leadership over the work of local organs of state
administration."24 Similarly, even if Taiwan were to have its own military
forces, it is doubtful that the head of the executive in the "Taiwan SAR"
would have supreme command over them, as the President of the ROC does
now.249 This would seem incompatible with the role of the PRC Central
Military Commission as director of the PRC's armed forces. 250 The scope
of the promise in the White Paper obviously needs clarification.
2. Accountability
As the Chief Executive is the most powerful figure in the HKSAR
government, an assessment of his or her accountability to the Hong Kong
people is crucial to determining their capacity to influence administrative
decision-making in the region. The Basic Law addresses the accountability
of the Chief Executive in two ways. It specifies how the Chief Executive is
to be selected, and to whom the Chief Executive, once selected, is to be
responsible.
The Basic Law provides that the Chief Executive must be a Chinese
citizen who is a permanent resident of the HKSAR, has ordinarily resided
there for a continuous period of not less than twenty years, and has no right
of abode in any foreign country. This accords with the PRC's principle of
"Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong., 252  However, although the
Basic Law states that the "ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief
Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly
representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic
procedures,, 253 there is no guarantee that this will occur. The method for
selecting the Chief Executive is set out in Annex I of the Basic Law. Until
2007, at least, the candidate for Chief Executive is chosen by an Election
Committee of 800 members, divided into four groups of 200 chosen from
248 XIANFA [P.R.C.] art. 89 §4.
249 XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 36.
250 See XIANFA [P.R.C.] art. 93.
25 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, arts 3 & 44. The principal officers of the HKSAR must also satisfy
these requirements, except that the residence requirement is only 15 years. Id. art. 61. See also, in telation
to the Executive Council, id. art. 55.
212 "Gang ren zhi gang." Zhang Youyu, supra note 164, at 12-15.
253 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 45. Compare art. 68.
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four designated occupational or social sectors.254 This system is clearly
derived from the "functional constituencies" used in LegCo elections under
British rule.255 It is undemocratic in that the sectors vary greatly in the
number of people they cover (the value of some votes will greatly exceed
that of others) and, depending how the sectors are defined, many Hong
Kong residents may not fall within any of the sectors and thus have no
vote.256 The system can be amended after 2007, but this requires the
consent of two-thirds of the Legislative Council, the Chief Executive and
the NPC Standing Committee.257
Even were this selection system to reach its "ultimate aim" and
produce an electoral body representing all the people of Hong Kong
equally, it would still not provide full accountability. This is because the
"selection" of the Chief Executive by the Election Committee is really
equivalent to nomination only. The Chief Executive is appointed by the
CPG, which therefore retains ultimate control. 25' Thus, an election could be
held within the HKSAR, a candidate selected and then the whole process
effectively voided by a refusal of the CPG to approve that person.259
Since the elections of 1996, the President of the ROC has been
directly elected by universal suffrage. 260 The Premier, although not directly
elected, is appointed by the President with the consent of the Legislative
254 These are (1) industrial, commercial and financial sectors; (2) the professions; (3) labour, social
services, religious and other sectors, and; (4) members of the Legislative Council, representatives of
district-based organisations, Hong Kong deputies to the NPC and representatives of Hong Kong members
of the National People's Political Consultative Conference. Id. Annex I. para.2. The composition of each
sector and method of selecting representatives is to be stipulated by laws enacted by the Legislative
Council. Id. Annex 1. para 3. The first Chief Executive was chosen by a special Selection Committee
composed of 400 Hong Kong permanent residents, 100 from each sector. All were chosen by a
"Preparatory Committee" appointed by the NPC. See Decision of the National People's Congress on the
Method for the Formation of the First Government and First Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National People's Congress, 4 April,
1990, available in THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR "STABILITY AND PROSPERITY" UNDER
CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY?, supra note 38, at 207. The first Chief Executive is Tung Chee Hwa, selected
Dec. 11, 1996 and appointed by Premier Li Peng, Dec. 16, 1997. Ren Xin, A Beginning for Democracy in
Hong Kong, BEIJING REv., Jan 13-19, 1997, p.5 .
255 See MINERS, supra note 52, at 116-18.
256 Three of the four groups, (1), (2) and (4), in note 253--have much smaller coverage than (3).
These groups are generally pro-Beijing. WANG, HONG KONG 1997, supra note 16, at 80.
257 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, at 263.
258 Id. art. 15, 45. WANG, XIANGGANG JIBENFA, supra note 164, at 63-65. Tamanaha points out
that HKSAR has less control over its Chief Executive than most autonomous entities, which select their
Chief Executive without central government interference. Tamanaha, supra note 16, at 48.
259 The CPG also has power to approve the other key members of the executive, who are
nominated by the Chief Executive. BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 48(5).
260 See supra note 146, and accompanying text.
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Yuan, which is also directly elected. 26' The introduction of a heavily
weighted electoral system would thus diminish democratic government.
Further, the President, Premier and other key officials in the executive take
office without requiring the confirmation of any body not itself directly
accountable solely to the Taiwanese people.262 The requirement that the
chief officer of an SAR be appointed by the CPG would remove the ability
of the Taiwanese people to choose their own head.
The PRC government could, in any Basic Law of Taiwan, preserve
the existing Taiwan system of appointing key officials in the executive,
instead of insisting on central government approval. The position would
then be similar to that of the practice of many autonomous regions, or many
federal systems263 where the appointment of the head of a state's
administration is not subject to central government confirmation. 21 Its
willingness to do so may be doubted, given the hostility directed at the two
main presidential candidates in the 1996 elections.265 It is difficult to see
how the PRC government could allow a situation to occur in which the head
of the Taiwanese administration is a person who was both popularly elected
and actively denounced communism and the central government.
The CPG control over the HKSAR Chief Executive does not end with
the appointment process. The Basic Law specifically provides that, once
appointed, the Chief Executive is accountable to the CPG as well as to the
HKSAR.266 The significance of this obligation is unclear. The body in the
HKSAR to which the Chief Executive and the HKSAR government is
accountable is the Legislature. 267 The Law does not indicate how the Chief
Executive would resolve a conflict between these two loyalties or how the
CPG would ensure that the Chief Executive remains accountable to it.
There is no specific power in the Basic Law which would enable the CPG to
261 XIANFA [R.O.C.] arts 55, 62 & 64.
262 Id. arts 55, 56; AA art. 2 (1994).
26 Such as Australia or the United States.
264 See generally Hannum & Lillich, supra note 13, at 219-24; Tamanaha, supra note 16, at 48-49.
265 Pringle, supra note 19.
266 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 43.
267 Id art. 64. The Chief Executive is accountable to the Legislative Council in that it can impeach
the Chief Executive or force him or her to resign. Id. arts 52(2), (3) & 73(9). The Legislative Council
must also approve the government's revenue and expenditure measures. Id. art. 73 (2) and (3). The
Legislative Council may generally supervise and investigate the operation of government. Id. art. 73(4)
(receiving and debating the policy addresses of the Chief Executive); art. 73(5) (raising questions
concerning the work of the government); art. 73(6) debating any issue concerning the public interest); art.
73(8) (receiving and handling complaints from Hong Kong residents); and art. 73(10) (summoning persons
to testify and give evidence).
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dismiss the Chief Executive for refusing to carry out its directives.268 On
the other hand, while the Legislative Council can procure the Chief
Executive's resignation, it can only do so after he or she has ordered it to be
dissolved.269
Whatever the nature of the Chief Executive's accountability to the
CPG, the fact that it is required would raise objections in Taiwan if a similar
provision were imposed there. The executive in Taiwan is accountable only
to other branches of government in Taiwan, not to any external authority.270
The imposition of another layer of accountability would not only diminish
the capacity of Taiwanese institutions to restrain each other, it would further
complicate what is already a highly intricate set of relationships between the
various arms of government in Taiwan.
C. Legislative Power
1. Autonomy
Legislative power in the HKSAR is vested in the Legislative
Council.27' Given that very few national PRC laws apply in the HKSAR,
272
the Legislative Council may make most of the civil, criminal, and
administrative law effective in the HKSAR. However, in comparison with
2 If the CPG wished to do so, but considered they lacked the power, they could request that the
NPC amend the Basic Law.
269 The Chief Executive must resign if inter alia (1) she or her refuses to pass a bill; (2) the
Legislative Council passes it again with a two-thirds majority; (3) the Chief Executive still refuses to sign
and dissolves the Council; (4) the new Council passes the bill with a two thirds majority; and the Chief
Executive still refuses to sign. BASIC LAW, supra note 38, arts 49, 50, 52(2). The Chief Executive must
also resign if the Council refuses to pass a budget or other important government bill, and after being
dissolved and re-elected, still refuses to pass the bills. Id. arts 50 & 52. The Legislative Council can also
impeach the Chief Executive. Id art. 73(9).
270 For example, the President is accountable to the Legislative Yuan in that it must confirm a
presidential decree'of martial law or emergency measures. XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 39, 43, AA art. 2 (1994).
Presidential appointments are subject to confirmation by the Legislative Yuan or the National Assembly
(id. art. 55; AA art. 2, 4, 5, 6) or must be made on the recommendation of the Premier (id. art. 56). The
Premier is accountable to the Legislative Yuan in that (I) the Legislature must consent to his or her
appointment initially and whenever it is re-elected (id. art. 55; see also Council of Grand Justices
Interpretation 387, available in LIUFA QUANSHU, supra note 90 and compare Interpretation 391); and (2)
the Executive Yuan must report on its administrative policies to the Legislative Yuan, which may request it
to alter its policies. If it refuses to do so, the Legislative Yuan can, if it upholds its original resolution by a
two-thirds majority, force the Premier to abide by it or resign. XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 57 § 1, 2. In addition,
budgets bills must be passed by the Legislative Yuan. Id. art. 58.
271 Id. art. 66, 73(l).
272 See supra note 167, and accompanying text.
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the equivalent body in Taiwan, the Legislative Yuan, 273 its legislative
competence is considerably restricted.
First, although laws enacted by the Legislative Council do not require
the approval of the central government in order to take effect,274 the Council
may not amend the Basic Law275 nor make any law that contravenes it.276
The catch here is that it is the NPC Standing Committee which decides
whether or not a law enacted by the Legislative Council violates the Basic
Law.277 So a Legislative Council enactment could be invalidated if, in the
opinion of the Standing Committee, it encroached on the matters within the
responsibility of the central government (such as defence or foreign affairs)
or the relationship between the central government and the HKSAR. The
Standing Committee is not obliged to give reasons for a decision to
invalidate, nor is such a decision subject to any time limit. In contrast, once
the Legislative Yuan passes a law and that law is promulgated by the
President, it may be invalidated only by a judicial finding of
unconstitutionality. Furthermore, the Legislative Yuan may, with the
consent of the National Assembly, amend the ROC Constitution.278
Second, in the event that the NPC Standing Committee declares a
state of war or, "by reason of turmoil within the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region which endangers national unity or security and is
beyond the control of the government of the region" decides that the Special
Administrative Region is in a state of emergency, the CPG may by decree
apply national PRC laws to the HKSAR.279 If this occurred, the legislative
autonomy of the HKSAR under OCTS would be effectively destroyed.280
On the other hand, where a state of emergency occurs in Taiwan, any
emergency orders (which are made by the President) are subject to
273 XIANFA (R.O.C.] art. 62. In contrast to the original constitutional position (which provides for
the legislative powers of initiative and referendum), under the Additional Articles the National Assembly
cannot enact or annul laws. AA art. 1 (1994); compare XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 27.
274 Although they must be reported to the NPC Standing Committee, this is for the record only.
BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art.17. See Wu, supra note 164, at 70-7 1.
275 See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
276 BASIC LAW art. 11, supra note 38, at 170.
277 Id. art. 17, at 171, and art. 160, at 203. The Standing Committee, if it decides the Basic Law
has been contravened, cannot amend the law. However, the law loses effect as soon as the Committee
"returns" it. This is consistent with the XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 67, sec. 8. See Wu, supra note 164, at 74-78.
279 XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 174.
279 BASIC LAW art. 18, supra note 38, at 171-72.
230 WANG, XIANGGANG JIBENFA, supra note 164, at 77-78.
JULY 1997
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
confirmation within ten days of issuance by the Legislative Yuan.28' It
therefore retains ultimate law-making control.
Third, while a Legislative Council bill does not require the consent of
the central government to take effect, it does require the consent of the
Chief Executive, whose appointment is, as has been seen, controlled by the
CPG.2 s2 Should the Chief Executive refuse to sign a bill, the Legislative
Council is in a weak position. At most, it can force the Chief Executive's
resignation, but only after a three-step process: (1) the Council repasses the
bill with a two-thirds majority, (2) the Chief Executive dissolves the
Council but the re-elected members again pass the bill, and (3) the Chief
Executive still refuses to sign.2 3 However, a two-thirds majority vote in the
Legislative Yuan will override an Executive Yuan veto of its legislation
without the legislature being subject to dissolution.28 4
Fourth, there are also express limitations on the Legislative Council's
legislative competence, even within the limits of the HKSAR. It does not,
until at least 2007, have final control over its own voting procedures or over
how it is elected, 2 5 and any bills relating to government policies require the
consent of the Chief Executive. 6 Its laws must implement free market
economic policies.287 Further, article 23 of the Basic Law provides that the
Council must enact laws:
[T]o prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion
against the Central People's Government, or theft of state
secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies
from conducting political activities in the Region, and to
prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from
231 XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 43, as amended by AA art. 2 (1994).
282 BASIC LAW art. 76, supra note 38, at 184-85.
233 BASIC LAW arts. 49, 50, & 52, supra note 38, at 178-79. The resignation of the Chief Executive
under these cumbersome conditions still does not necessarily result in the bill being passed. Wesley-Smith,
The Legal System and Constitutional Issues, in THE BASIC LAW AND HONG KONG'S FUTURE, supra note
164, at 178.
234 XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 57. Article 57 may be substantially amended by the National Assembly as
a result of decisions made by the National Development Conference in Taipei in December 1996. See
supra note 142.
285 BASIC LAW Annex I, supra note 38, at 204. After 2007 the Annex can be amended by a two-
thirds majority vote of the Legislative Council, but this requires the consent of the Chief Executive. Id
286 See WANG, XIANGGANG JIBENFA, supra note 164, at 71.
237 See supra notes 230-237, and accompanying text.
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establishing ties with foreign political organizations or
bodies.8
8
The Legislative Yuan is not subject to such limitations. It controls its own
procedures and electoral process, subject to the ROC Constitution. 28 9 It is
not subject to the "government policy" restriction, and, as is the case with
the Executive Yuan, the fundamental national policies in the ROC
Constitution are not binding on it.290 Nor is it required to enact legislation
in the form of article 23 of the Basic Law. Indeed, since such legislation
appears to violate fundamental human rights in Chapter II of the ROC
Constitution29' (which unlike the national policies are binding), it would
probably be unconstitutional.
2. Accountability
The accountability of the Legislative Council to the people of Hong
Kong is greater than that of the Chief Executive. That is, there is no
provision in the Basic Law requiring the Legislative Council to be
accountable to the CPG. It may therefore be supposed that its members
represent their constituents in Hong Kong, not the central government.
Moreover, members are appointed by election alone not by the CPG.
However, accountability is nevertheless compromised by the nature
of the electoral process, which, like that applying to the Chief Executive, is
not fully democratic. The Basic Law ensures that the legislative power will
be exercised largely by Hong Kong permanent residents192 and, as with the
Chief Executive, the "ultimate aim" is that Legislative Council members be
elected by universal suffrage.293 But, again, there is no guarantee that this
will occur. Until at least 2007, only part of the Council will be directly
elected and half the Council will be chosen by "functional
2S3 BASIC LAW art. 23, supra note 38, at 173. For a discussion of article 23 in the light of the
common law of sedition, see David Clark, Sedition and Article 23, in HONG KONG'S BASIC LAW:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 164; see also Han, supra note 164, at 332-33.
29 XIANFA [R.O.C.] art. 76. Lifayuan Zuzhi Fa [Lifayflan Tsuchih Fa][Organisation Law of the
Legislative Yuan] and Gongzhi Renyuan Xuanju Bamian Fa [Kungchih Jenytlan Pamian Fa][Law on the
Election and Recall of Public Officials], both available in LIUFA QUANSHU, supra note 90.
2W See LIN ZIYI, supra note 104, at 156-60.
291 E.g., XIANFA [R.O.C.J art. I I (freedom of speech, teaching, writing and publication).
M Eighty percent of a Legislative Council meeting must be HKSAR residents with no right of
abode in any foreign country. BASIC LAW art. 67, supra note 38, at 182.
M Id. art. 68.
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constituencies, '294 the majority of which are likely to reflect pro-Beijing
views. 295 The strong rejection by Beijing of the so-called Patten democratic
reforms in the final years of British rule,296 manifested most clearly in the
refusal to allow the last LegCo elected under the British to continue after
July 1997297 indicates its resistance, at this time, towards universal
suffrage.2 98  Conversely, as discussed above, members of the Legislative
Yuan in Taiwan are already chosen in direct, competitive, elections by
universal suffrage.299
A further concern is the extent to which the people of Hong Kong
will be able to form political parties in order to compete for election to the
Legislative Council. The Basic Law does not expressly permit the
continued operation of political parties. 00 On the other hand, article 23,
cited above, may be used to authorise the prohibition of political parties
294 Id. Annex 11, sec. 1, at 204.
295 Andy Ho, Provisional Legislators Fail to Inspire Public Support, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Dec. 24, 1996, at 17. Ho comments that the Council is dominated by pro-Beijing business and professional
elites. The delimitation of these constituencies is to be determined by the Legislative Council: BASIC LAW
Annex 11, sec. 2, supra note 38, at 205.
296 See David Carter, Hong Kong: Is Democracy in its Future?, 3 D.C.L. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 551,
554-57 (1994); see also Bryan Gregory, Envisioning Futures: The Battle Over Democracy in Hong Kong,
19 N.C. J. INT'L. L. & COM. REG. 175 (1993).
297 This possibility was originally left open by the NPC. See Decision of the National People's
Congress on the Method for the Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative Council of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, para. 6, in BASIC LAW, supra note 38, at 208.
291 See Davis, Human Rights and the Founding of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region: A
Framework for Analysis, supra note 170, at 321-29. The Preliminary Working Committee established by
the NPC in 1993 decided on Dec. 8, 1994 to establish a provisional HKSAR legislature, which would
replace the last LegCo under British rule on July I, 1997. Id. at 326-27. The NPC passed a resolution in
1995 that that LegCo, and other elected bodies be disbanded upon the PRC takeover. Id at 327-28. See
also Chris Yeung & Linda Choy, NPC Votes to End HK Political Structure, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. I, 1994 at I. Several commentators have argued that this does not accord with the Basic Law
provisions regulating the selection of the legislature between 1997 and 2007. See, e.g., Yash Ghai, Back to
Basics: The Provisional Legislature and the Basic Law, 25 HONG KONG L. J. 2 (1995); Stephen Law
Shing-yan, The Constitutionality of the Provisional Legislature, 26 HONG KONG L.J. 152 (1996). Britain
has claimed that the establishment of the legislature violates the Joint Declaration. Chris Yeung, UK
Challenges Provisional Body: Let International Court of Justice Settle Legality of Shadow Legislature,
Britain Urges, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 21, 1996 at 1. The Provisional Legislative Council was
elected by the Selection Committee who selected the first Chief Executive on Dec. 21, 1996. See supra
note 254 and accompanying text. Thirty-three of the members of the last Legislative Council under British
rule were elected to the Provisional Legislative Council. Ren Xin, A Beginning for Democracy in Hong
Kong, BEIJING REV., Jan 13-19, 1997, at 7. However, this appears to have occurred as a result of a
direction to the Selection Committee by the Chinese Vice-Premier Qian Qichen. Ho, supra note 295, at 17.
For a discussion of the opposition of the PRC to full democratisation during the Basic Law drafting
process, see CHAN & CLARK, supra note 38, at 13-29.
299 See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text.300 It does, however, protect freedom of speech and of assembly. BASIC LAW art.27, supra note 38,
at 174.
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having foreign links3"' or engaging in "subversion against the Central
People's Government." Moreover, the Basic Law does not clarify the
position of the CCP in Hong Kong and in particular its relationship with the
HKSAR government; the extent to which the CCP tolerates rivals may be a
key factor in determining the outcome of the next Legislative Council
election, due in 1999.302
Would Taiwan's political parties be able to operate freely in a
"Taiwan SAR?" The PRC White Paper states that Taiwan will be able to
maintain its own political parties,3 °3 but this policy was devised when
Taiwan was under martial law and there was effectively only one party, the
KMT. Now there are many, and, of much concern to Beijing, several of
them advocate Taiwanese independence. 304  At present, the power to
dissolve political parties for unconstitutional activities in Taiwan is vested
in the Council of Grand Justices, sitting as a constitutional court. 305 This
has, so far, not been exercised against a party advocating independence. On
the other hand, the Basic Law of Hong Kong specifically aims to prohibit
conduct relating to "secession" [fenlie guojia . . . de xingwei], and this
seems on its face to prohibit parties advocating Taiwanese independence.
D. Judicial power
1. Autonomy
As far as judicial power is concerned, the HKSAR does indeed
exercise a very high degree of autonomy. According to the Basic Law, the
legal system of the HKSAR is based on the common law and thus is quite
separate from the socialist legal system practised in the rest of China. The
judges of the HKSAR exercise independent 0 6 judicial power0 7 and in
contrast to the position under British rule, where the Privy Council was the
301 But cf article 149, which allows non-governmental, non-political organisations to maintain
international links. Id. art. 149, at 199.
302 See Christine Loh, The CCP and the Rule of Law in Hong Kong, 25 HONG KONG L.J. 149
(1995).
303 TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE AND INFORMATION OFFICE, supra note 3, at v. Chinese version, supra
note 3, at 16.
304 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
305 AA. art. 4§2, §3 (1994). See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
306 Article 85 of the BASIC LAW, supra note 38, provides that the HKSAR courts "shall exercise
judicial power independently, free from any interference." Compare the similar wording in XIANFA
[P.R.C.] art. 126.
307 BASIC LAW, supra note 3 8, arts 2, 19.
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final court of appeal, final adjudicative power is located within the HKSAR
court system. 308 The Privy Council has been replaced by the Court of Final
Appeal.30 9 In other respects, the court system established under the British
has been preserved 3 " and judges appointed under British rule may retain
their positions.31'
There is however, a major qualification to this autonomy:312 the
HKSAR courts do not have final power to interpret the Basic Law. This is
vested in the Standing Committee of the NPC, in accordance with the PRC
constitution.31 3 Under the Basic Law, the Standing Committee authorises
the HKSAR courts to interpret, in the course of adjudicating cases, those
provisions of the Basic Law which are within the limits of HKSAR
autonomy. 3 " The Basic Law also provides that the courts can determine
other provisions in the Basic Law. However, if these concern affairs which
are the responsibility of the CPG, or the relationship between the CPG and
the HKSAR, 315  the courts must, before making a final non-appealable
judgement, seek an opinion from the Standing Committee, and this is
binding on them.3t 6 As the Standing Committee is not a court and its
30s Id arts 2, 19, & 82.
309 fd art. 82.
310 Id. arts. 8, 81 and 87. However, the Legislative Council may alter the structures, powers and
functions of the courts. Id. art. 83.
31 Id. art. 93.
312 There is another qualification to the power, which is that the courts have no jurisdiction over
"acts of state such as defence and foreign affairs." BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 19. Where such
questions arise during the course of adjudication, the courts must obtain a certificate from the Chief
Executive, which is issued on the basis of a certifying document from the CPG and which is binding on the
courts. While the meaning of this provision is controversial, its effect seems to be to preserve the common
law act of state doctrine. See WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN HONG
KONG, supra note 52, at 106. Compare WANG, THE BASIC LAW OF HONG KONG, supra note 164, at 90-91.
In relation to a previous draft provision, which appeared to extend the judicial restriction beyond the act of
state doctrine, see Tamanaha, supra note 16, at 53-54.
313 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 158. XIANFA [P.R.C.] art. 67(4). For a discussion of the
approach to judicial and legislative interpretation of law in the PRC, see Daniel Fung, The Basic Law of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China: Problems of Interpretation,
37 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 701, 702-06 (1988).
314 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 158.
315 It is unclear whether there are provisions in the Basic Law which are outside the jurisdiction of
the HKSAR but do not concern the CPG. See Trevor M. Morris, Some Problems Regarding the Power of
Constitutional Interpretation under Article 158 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, 21 HONG KONG L.J. 87, 90 (1991).
316 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, art. 158. For a discussion of the how this provision may operate,
see Morris, supra note 315, at 96-99. Morris identifies a key difficulty with the provision: who determines
whether or not a provision of the Basic Law relates to matters which are the responsibility of the CPG or to
CPG-HKSAR relations. Since such decisions concern CPG-HKSAR relations, it would seem they should
be made by the NPC Standing Committee. However, this may lead to a high number of cases being
delayed while a decision on jurisdiction is sought from the Standing Committee.
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interpretations are likely to be based on socialist, not common law concepts,
its interpretation power may have a very significant impact on the way the
Basic Law operates.
317
If the judicial system established under the Basic Law were applied in
Taiwan, the island would keep its separate judicial structure and its civil law
system would be protected. However, its highest judicial organ, the Council
of Grand Justices, would lose its power of conclusive constitutional
interpretation. 318  As discussed above, the Council has made a major
contribution to the democratisation process in Taiwan, and has become a
significant check on the actions of the other branches of government.1 9
While it might continue to review the validity of legislation within the
"Taiwan SAR," the Council would no longer restrain the institutions
exercising ultimate legislative and executive authority over Taiwan, which
would be the NPC, its Standing Committee and the State Council.
Furthermore, a breakdown in the separation of powers currently maintained
in Taiwan320 would occur, since the final interpretative power would be
exercised by an institution also exercising legislative power (the NPC
Standing Committee).
317 For example, the concept of "judicial independence" in the PRC is quite different from that in
common law and civil law systems. In the PRC, it is the courts that are independent, not individual judges,
and the courts are subject to supervision of the people's congresses (controlled by the CCP). See Margaret
Y.K. Woo, Adjudication Supervision and Judicial Independence in the PRC, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 95
(1991). However, the wording in the PRC Constitution and the Basic Law referring to judicial
independence is very similar. If the Basic Law provisions were interpreted by the NPC Standing
Committee in light of PRC practice, it would permit a greater degree of interference in judicial decision-
making than would be permitted in a common law system. See Denis Chang, Towards a Jurisprudence of
a Third Kind---"One Country Two Systems," 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. LAW 99, 110-111 (1988); See
WESLEY-SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW supra note 52, at 69; WANG, THE HONG
KONG BASIC LAW, supra note 164, at 92-95. Fung (commenting on an early draft of the Basic Law) has
argued that the process in article 158 is inconsistent with other provisions in the Basic Law preserving the
common law system, since under the common law, courts must be able to interpret legislation
authoritatively. Fung, supra note 313, at 707-10. He goes on to propose the establishment of a
Constitutional Court to deal with the difficult jurisdictional issues arising under the provision.
318 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
319 See supra notes 152-161 and accompanying text.
320 The Council of Grand Justices has held that the separation of powers is one of the fundamental
principles in the ROC Constitution. Interpretation 419.
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2. Accountability
The notion of judicial "accountability" is problematic and the
discussion here therefore focuses on the selection of judges. Judges of the
HKSAR are appointed by the Chief Executive on the recommendation of an
independent commission. Judges may only be removed by the Chief
Executive on the recommendation of a tribunal composed of three local
judges.322 The appointment and removal of judges of the Final Court of
Appeal is subject to the approval of the Legislative Council.323 This process
seems likely to protect the independence of the judiciary, but as the Chief
Executive has a central role, the process may be undermined if he or she is
tightly controlled by the CPG.
A Taiwan Basic Law might be expected to preserve Taiwan's system
of appointing judges, which is a version of the civil law model.324 One
potential source of controversy is the appointment of the Council of Grand
Justices, which follows a procedure different from the other judicial bodies.
Under the ROC Constitution, as amended by the Additional Articles, Grand
Justices are nominated by the President and confirmed by the National
Assembly.325 Were the position of President of the ROC to be transformed
into "Chief Executive of the Taiwan SAR," subject to the same CPG control
as is the case with the Hong Kong Chief Executive, the appointment process
could be compromised.
V. CONCLUSION
The PRC's OCTS model may once have been a feasible plan for the
peaceful reunification of China, but it has been overtaken by fundamental
political and constitutional reform on Taiwan. OCTS was originally
designed to deal with the features of a colonial or authoritarian regime. It
321 BASIC LAW, supra note 38, arts 48(6) & 88. The commission is composed of local judges,
persons from the legal profession and eminent persons from other sectors. The Chief Justice of the Court
of Final Appeal and the Chief Judge of the Court of the HKSAR must be permanent residents of the
HKSAR with no right of abode in any foreign country. Id art. 90.
322 Id. art. 89. The tribunal is appointed by the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal. If she or
he is to be removed, the Chief Executive must appoint a tribunal of five local judges. Grounds for removal
are (1) inability to discharge duties or (2) misbehaviour. Id.
323 Id. art. 90.
324 See, Wang Tze-chien, The State of the Judicature in the Republic of China: Restructuring
Justice in a Changing Society 4-6 (1995). Unpublished paper on file with the author.323 XIANFA [R.O.C.], art 79; AA, art. 4 (1994).
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therefore assumed that the people of Taiwan and Hong Kong had limited
autonomy and accountability and that it was possible to negotiate the lawful
transfer of control over both areas without reference to the wishes of the
majority of those people.
Since Taiwan has democratised and is now in essence a de facto
independent liberal democracy, OCTS can no longer deliver on its
promises. It claims that the Taiwanese will enjoy a "high degree of
autonomy," be "masters of their own house" and that their "way of life" will
not change. However, in comparison with their current position, where they
exercise final control over their own government, the Taiwanese under
OCTS would see their autonomy and accountability greatly reduced, and
their way of life, at least in a political sense, would radically change.
Given that it cannot succeed even on its own terms, the PRC
persistence with OCTS in its present form is futile. It is almost certain to
face continuing rejection by the representative organs of government in
Taiwan. It could then be implemented only by the PRC rejecting the
legitimacy of government in Taiwan (not just that government's claims to
statehood) and imposing OCTS through intimidation or force. Since
Taiwan, unlike Hong Kong, has a powerful defence force,3"6 and may be
assisted by other powers, such as the United States, this result would be
disastrous.32 7
A preferable solution would be for the PRC to consider alternative
models for reunification. This would entail changing the substance of
OCTS, although the name could presumably be retained if this were thought
necessary to avoid making an obvious policy about-face. There are a wide
range of options for reunification between complete independence (which is
unacceptable to the PRC) and Hong Kong style autonomy (which cannot
succeed in Taiwan),328 including various forms of federal systems and
looser associations.
326 See GARY KLINTWORTH, NEW TAIWAN, NEW CHINA: TAIWAN'S CHANGING ROLE IN THE ASIA-
PACIFIC REGION, Ch. 8 (1995).
327 The tension over the reunification issue is heightened because Taiwan, unlike Hong Kong, is of
great strategic significance. Failure to reunify with Taiwan would not only be viewed in Beijing as a threat
to its claims to sovereignty, it is also threat to its security. Andrew J. Nathan, China's Goals in the Taiwan
Strait, 36 CHINA J. 87 (1996) For a discussion of this issue in the wake of the crisis in the Taiwan Straits
during the 1996 Taiwanese Presidential elections, see Forum: The Taiwan Crisis, 36 CHINA J. 87-134
(1996).
" -See, e.g., the different systems discussed in MODELS OF AUTONOMY, supra, note 13. An
examination of the competing merits of these in the context of Taiwan is beyond the scope of this article.
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On the other hand, there are many obstacles in the way of the PRC
altering its existing policy. For any arrangement to be at least partly
compatible with Taiwan's current political system, it would have to involve
limiting the PRC central government's ultimate authority over Taiwan.
This is likely to encounter strong resistance in the PRC, not least because it
opens the door to demands that such a system extend to other areas of the
country, such as Hong Kong and Macau, Tibet and Xinjiang and perhaps all
the provinces. Such demands would not only weaken the power of the
centralised government, they would raise fears of the disintegration of
China as a strong unified state. Any national leader who risked this
occurring would be contradicting both contemporary CCP ideology and
traditional Confucian-Legalist concepts of central government
sovereignty.329
Furthermore, even were the CCP prepared to compromise on the
issue of the unitary state, this would not necessarily secure reunification
with Taiwan. Although the majority of Taiwanese still appear to favour
eventual reunification, it is unclear if this is a genuine desire or simply a
preference for the status quo-de facto independence without the risk of a
war a formal declaration of independence would bring.33 °
Nevertheless, if negotiations between the two sides of the Taiwan
Straits are to progress, and the PRC's stated preference for peaceful
reunification remain a realistic goal, the substance of 'OCTS' (assuming the
slogan is retained), will need to be transformed. The model as reflected in
the Basic Law of Hong Kong is not at all appropriate for Taiwan.
329 OCTS had the endorsement of Deng Xiaoping, and any subsequent national leader modifying
such a key policy on an issue as sensitive as Taiwan risks undermining his or her authority. The
reunification project is invested with near spiritual significance: President Jiang Zemin has described
reunification as "the sacred mission and lofty purpose of all Chinese people." [... suoyou Zhongguoren de
Shensheng Shiming he Chonggai Mubiao], Jiang Zemin Jianghua, supra note 36, at I.
330 Until the mid 1990's, opinion polls indicated less than 20% of Taiwanese supported
independence. See opinion polls collected in GUOLI BIANYIGUAN, GUOJIA TONGYI GANLING YU DALUZHENGCE [KUOLI PIENIKUAN, KUOCHIA T'UNGI KANLING YU TALU CHENGTS'EI[GUIDELINES ONNATIONAL REUNIFICATION AND MAINLAND POLICY], Appendix 4 Table 1 (1993). However, recent polls
show a surge in the support for independence. A poll conducted by the mass-circulation United Daily
News [Lianhe Bao] showed 34% support for independence (up from 24% in 1995) compared to 37%
support for reunification, the remainder having no comment. Reported in Pro-independence Mood
Growing in Taiwan, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Jan. 30, 1997, available in Lexis, ASIAPC Library,
CURNWS File.
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